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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation explores economic impacts of food related illness on agricultural 
industries and models the performance of food safety programs on supply chain participants. 
Three stand-alone studies are dedicated to economic analysis on food safety issues from 
different approaches analytically, empirically, and in simulation.  
 In response to recent outbreaks of food-borne illness, the fresh produce and fruit 
industries have adopted marketing agreements to ensure the consistency of food safety. 
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical framework and simulation analysis to illustrate farmers’ 
behavior on implementing Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs), and the design of monitoring 
strategies in setting marketing agreements. It reveals that, if the monitoring resources are not 
high enough to achieve full compliance on GAPs, the general rule is to allocate resources so 
that the total amount of decreased fraud in terms of safety effort is the same for all farms. 
When auditing resources are very low, the size effect is dominant and larger farms are 
inspected first; when auditing resources are large enough, the cost effect is dominant and 
smaller farms are inspected first. The optimal auditing probability for smaller farms increases 
faster than that for larger farms. 
Contracts now are widely used between processors and growers to specify product 
quality and safety attributes. Chapter 3 employs a multitask principal-agent model to analyze 
the optimal incentive structure in contract food production. It offers guidance on 
understanding contractual relations for both food quality and food safety, and how the 
inclusion of a traceability system influences the provisions of the contract. 
 
vii 
 
Recent outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in Asia, Europe, and 
Africa have caused severe impacts on the broiler sector through production loss, trade 
restrictions and negative demand shocks. Chapter 4 presents a multimarket econometric 
model to conduct simulation analyses on the spread and market implications of a potential 
HPAI outbreak in U.S. broiler industry. It takes into account market power that might exist 
within the livestock and meat sectors and makes endogenous the optimal production 
conditions in the model system. Findings from the analysis imply that the HPAI shocks 
impact prices at different marketing levels unequally and change the price margin along the 
supply chain with the existence of market power. However, the change in the price margin is 
quite small in absolute value. 
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Numerous food scares and crises have occurred over the past few years in the US food 
supply chain, even though it is considered one of the safest in the world. Failure to protect 
the safety of food leads to a decline in consumer confidence in the safety of many food 
products and threatens the economic vitality of agricultural industries through economic 
relationships. Thus, the need to evaluate economic losses associated with food safety 
problems and to develop strategies to improve food safety throughout the supply chain has 
become a concern for both the government and agricultural industries. As a consequence, 
many programs have been developed by industry organizations or government agencies to 
reduce the risk of food contamination. Individual growers have also responded to increased 
concerns about foodborne illness by implementing food safety improving activities. The 
main theme of this dissertation is to understand the economic impacts of food related illness 
on agricultural industries and the performance of food safety programs on supply chain 
participants. 
To reduce foodborne illness in fruits and vegetables, Good Agricultural Practices 
(GAPs) have been developed for use by growers to ensure more consistent food safety 
outcomes. These agricultural practices act as guidelines for many marketing programs. The 
first topic of this dissertation, presented in Chapter 2, relates to a voluntary marketing 
agreement which was initialized by Western Growers in California. The agreement requires 
all signatory handlers to purchase only product from growers who adhere to newly developed 
Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs). Through regular on-farm control and inspection, third 
party inspectors (or public regulators) monitor compliance and provide a credible signal to 
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resolve the lack of information in the market. The primary incentive for the farms to join in 
the program is not to get high price premium but to minimize the risk of potential losses of 
market share. At the same time, marketing agreements along with Good Agricultural 
Practices can provide consumers with a substitute for the information and trust they lack. 
Marketing agreements, however, are susceptible to opportunistic behaviors. Food 
safety attributes are credence qualities which cannot be directly ascertained. Although 
consumers may prefer high-safety products to low-safety ones, they may not be able to tell 
the difference between the two. Farmers face the use of GAPs as an increased cost of 
producing the product. The existence of the cost gap between low and high-safety products 
with no apparent product difference to consumers provides an incentive for farmers not to 
comply with the full set of requirements. In the meanwhile, the reliability of the marketing 
agreement on enhancing food security depends on monitoring processes and their 
implementation. A farmer may decide to shirk in efforts to adopt and apply GAPs when 
monitoring activity is imperfect and costly. Therefore, the analysis of marketing agreements 
should account for the possibility of opportunistic behaviors. This study explores the 
marketing agreement’s performance on farmer decisions. The design of an optimal 
monitoring scheme varies with constraint monitoring resources on heterogeneous farms in 
terms of farm size. 
The analysis of agreements considers a market framework which consists of a 
continuum of farms with a credence food product. The on-farm inspection of the compliance 
with GAPs has two possible realizations: a farm either passes the inspection test to get the 
market price, or fails the test and receives a diverted price. Once a food incident happens, the 
final consumers’ demand will be affected. The negative consequences of a food safety 
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problem affect the industry in a collective way. At the same time, once a farm is traced back 
as producing unsafe product, it incurs an additional cost which may include the direct cost of 
liability, product recalls, market-imposed penalties and other fines levied due to the food 
crisis. The optimal level of effort invested by the farmer and the necessary monitoring rate to 
guide the farmer to achieve full compliance is derived from the model. Once committed to 
the agreement, farmers adopt different production decisions according to their individual 
farm size. Based on the assumption that the objective of the monitoring agency is to 
maximize total producers’ surplus, we obtain a scheme for distributing constrained 
monitoring resources. For the purposes of illustrating the implications of the model, the 
market for fresh strawberries in California is simulated. 
The fruit and vegetables industry is extensively vertically coordinated in the United 
States and contracts are widely used between processors and growers. The provisions of a 
basic processing fruit and vegetables contract may include many issues, and among them 
product quality usually plays an important role in a contract. Recent outbreaks of food-borne 
illness related to fruit and vegetables have triggered many industries to identify specific 
GAPs for adoption by growers on farm level to prevent food contamination. Many retail and 
foodservice buyers now demand that food suppliers adhere to some performance-based 
standards or specific criteria and target values for control and monitoring of product. 
Therefore, the processor pays more attention to food safety attributes and expects the grower 
to exert effort to make sure food is safe.  However, food safety is difficult to observe and 
measure, and the payoff for improved food safety is poorly contractible. 
A potential way to provide the grower an incentive to exert the effort needed to 
produce safe product is by implementing traceability systems in food supply chains. With a 
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traceability system, the source of unsafe products can be identifiable to some extent. If a 
grower is identified as the source of a food safety problem, the grower faces costs associated 
with the failure such as penalties and/or market loss, and the processor faces losses 
associated with disrupted input supply or market loss due to the safety failure in the 
processed product. The existence of traceability systems can be looked on as an indirect way 
to provide safety assurance and thus the provision of product safety can enter into a contract. 
Although safety is a component of quality, safety improvement activities frequently are not 
included in quality improvement activities. Activities on improving safety may be 
independent, complementary, or act as substitutes for quality. 
The objective of the second topic of this dissertation, Chapter 3, is to examine how the 
interaction between safety effort and quality effort influences the grower’s incentives, and to 
identify how a traceability system may affect contract provisions and mitigate the grower’s 
problem of moral hazard. 
We first construct a benchmark model in which a traceability system is absent. The 
processor minimizes the expected compensation by designing a payment scheme to induce 
high quality effort only. Next, the contract design with fully observable safety effort is 
examined. The grower performs two activities with respect to quality and safety efforts with 
the same production process. The two activities affect the stochastic production process 
simultaneously. Then, the incentive structure with a tractability system is developed that 
employs a multitask principal-agent model. In this case, the efforts provided by the grower in 
both quality and safety cannot be directly observed by the processor, and the measured 
quality level and whether there is a food accident or not is verifiable. A simultaneous 
shirking deviation along both quality and safety efforts dimensions may occur.  For each 
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form of contract we derive the conditions under which the contract is efficient, and examine 
the distribution of payoffs. We also obtain the extent to which contracts overcome adverse 
selection problems. The predictions of the theoretical model are given by simulation 
experiments. 
The third topic of this dissertation, Chapter 4, relates to the recent outbreaks of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in Asia, Europe, and Africa, an avian disease which has 
been recognized as a great threat to broiler production, wildlife conservation and public 
health. Outbreaks of HPAI have caused major changes in demand, additional input use to 
producers, and price volatility which could induce dramatic market instability. The United 
States exports more poultry products than any other country in the world. When export 
markets are taken into account, even a relatively small outbreak has the potential to cause a 
large welfare loss, especially if trade is restricted. Although mainly affecting the broiler 
sector and egg sectors, an HPAI shock is expected to influence other related livestock sectors 
as well. 
To understand the potential welfare effects of HPAI, we consider the transmission of 
HPAI shocks through various stages of the broiler supply chain and through other livestock 
and related agricultural markets. The impacts of shocks are determined by the behavior of 
market agents who are involved in the transactions. Price characterizes the linkages between 
markets. It has been argued that food scares may have differential effects on upstream 
suppliers and downstream users. Even though the causes of asymmetric price transmission 
are complicated and multidimensional, market power is a possible important explanation for 
this differential. 
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Livestock and meat sectors are increasingly vertically integrated in the United Stated.  
The linking of successive stages of production and marketing through ownership or 
contracting is widespread. This vertical integration in the meat industries generally increases 
market power and could increase welfare loss from an HPAI outbreak. The principle 
objective of this research is to conduct an HPAI risk and cost analysis while accounting for 
potential market power within the whole meat supply chain. 
A theoretical model is developed to illustrate the potential impacts of market power on 
the price margin and the distribution of economic welfare following a food scare such as an 
HPAI outbreak. If market power exists, the exogenous shocks influence the prices on 
different supply chain stages to varying degrees. As a result, the price margin might be 
widened or narrowed depending on the demand elasticities as well as interactions of 
exogenous shifters. We then construct an empirical model to estimate simultaneously the 
demand for five meat products in the United States. In order to examine the potential impacts 
of market power on price reaction elasticities, the “integrated” firm’s profit maximization 
conditions are considered to be endogenous in the demand system.  
An epidemiological-economic model is developed to simulate the spread and effects of 
the disease in the poultry and other meat sectors. The economic model is a multimarket 
partial equilibrium model and provides a complete depiction of key biological and economic 
relationships within five livestock and meat industries. The simulated market scenarios are 
classified according to the length and severity of the outbreak, number of birds removed from 
the market, percentage reduction in domestic and export demand for poultry products, 
duration of the demand shock, assumptions on diversion, and use of product destined for 
export markets. Since it is challenging to know in advance the range of an outbreak, this 
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study examines three possible scenarios of the extent of HPAI on broilers and layers: high, 
medium and low. The data used are obtained from USDA/ERS and NASS. The estimation is 
based on a sample consisting of 96 quarterly observations that cover the period 1981:1 - 
2004:4. The model is also calibrated by dynamic simulation over the same periods. The 
baseline projections are developed in the first quarter of 2000 and cover the period 2000:1-
2004:2. Effects of alternative scenarios are measured relative to this period. The firm-level 
production impacts and market-level changes in equilibrium prices and output are evaluated. 
 
1.2 Organization of the dissertation 
This dissertation carries out the economic analysis of agricultural programs and supply 
chain dynamics with explicit consideration of food safety issues. While each of these 
chapters can be viewed as a stand-alone study, they are all dedicated to an examination of the 
economic impacts of foodborne illnesses. A brief overview of the remainder of this 
dissertation is outlined as follows: 
• Chapter 2 examines the performance of a marketing agreement on the farmer’s 
behavior in implementing Good Agricultural Practices and designs an optimal 
monitoring scheme for the auditing agency. 
• Chapter 3 develops a multitask principal-agent model to examine contractual relations 
to both food quality and food safety, and how the inclusion of a traceability system in 
a contract influences the behavior of growers and processors as well as a contract 
provision to overcome moral hazard problems. 
• Chapter 4 conducts an HPAI risk and cost analysis for the United States while 
accounting for potential market power within the whole meat supply chain.   
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• Chapter 5 highlights the findings and their implications on the three topics discussed 
in this dissertation and outlines future directions. 
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CHAPTER 2. MARKETING AGREEMENTS, OPPORTUISTIC 
BEHAVIORS AND FOOD SAFETY DETECTION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Recent outbreaks of food-borne illness have raised concern about food safety and their 
effects on human health. A publicized food scare can damage the consumers’ trust in the 
safety of the affected product, which can lead to a decrease in demand and losses to the 
industry. For example, contamination of fresh spinach with the bacteria E.coli O157:H7 in 
Fall 2006 killed three people and made more than 4000 people sick. Spinach sales went down 
by 30 percent after the break and, for the most part, recovered within six months (Seltzer et 
al. 2009).  
Markets fail to offer the efficient level of safety for several reasons (Unnevehr and 
Jensen 1996). Since food safety attributes are credence qualities which cannot be directly 
ascertained through inspection or consumption (Darby and Karni 1973), consumers may not 
be able to tell the difference between a safe product and an unsafe product although they 
prefer the safe one. On the supply side, the level of effort exerted to deliver a safe food is 
private information and the food supplier can shirk in efforts to supply the level of safety 
consumers would demand with full information.  
To reduce food borne illness in fruits and vegetables, Good Agricultural Practices 
(GAPs) have been used as food safety guidance for growers to adopt on critical production 
steps to ensure the consistency of food safety. GAPs are designated practices that lead to 
food or agricultural products with attributes that are valued in the marketplace (Hobbs 2003). 
According to Hobbs (2003), GAPs can be classified as (i) private industry supply chain 
GAPs, where suppliers work with a specific processor, exporter or retailer in a closed supply 
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chain; (ii) industry group GAPs, where the GAPs are established by an industry association; 
(iii) national government-initiated GAPs; and (iv) international agencies-initiated GAPs. To 
guarantee trust and transparency, GAPs are designed to have detailed production standards 
covering all aspects of on-farm production activities. These agricultural practices act as 
guidelines for many voluntary marketing programs.  
In response to the spinach outbreak in 2006, Western Growers initiated changes in the 
California Marketing Agreement. The new agreement requires all signatory leafy greens 
handlers to purchase only product from growers who adhere to newly developed Leafy 
Greens Good Agricultural Practices. The standards and practices proposed by the agreement 
were tighter than those the government already had in place. Under the new marketing 
agreement, farms can enroll the program voluntarily and be awarded a certification mark for 
implementing the GAPs. The certification allows the farms to distinguish their output from 
those without certification. Farms need to communicate product safety to consumers or 
downstream purchasers, and offer the opportunity to enhance their profit as a differentiated 
product. From the perspective of downstream suppliers, certification is useful for sourcing 
vegetable supply from quality farms. Retailers, especially supermarkets, have increasingly 
turned to the adoption of GAPs with preferred farms (suppliers) as a means to differentiate 
their fresh produce from that of traditional wholesale markets on the basis of cleanliness and 
the provision of greater assurance of handling safe products.  The assurance that the 
certification provides ensures consumers of safer food from reliable sources. 
 Marketing agreements, however, are susceptible to opportunistic behaviors. Despite 
consumers’ increased demand for safe foods, farmers face higher costs through the use of 
GAPs. Once the farm has committed itself to fulfill the agreement’s requirements, the 
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existence of a cost difference between low and high safety foods provides an incentive not to 
comply with the full set of requirements. Moreover, since all participants in the marketing 
agreement can benefit from a higher reputation in general, individual farms have an incentive 
to invest less in safety activities. Farms may choose to partially free-ride on the effort 
provided by others.  Thus, voluntary activities motivated by private incentives provide less 
safety assurance than would be in the interest of the whole industry; fraudulent behaviors 
become possible when monitoring activity is imperfect and costly. Free-riding behaviors 
could alter the credibility of the marketing agreement and even lead to its collapse. 
Therefore, analysis of marketing agreements should account for the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviors.  However, to date, there has been little discussion about farmers’ 
behavior and the design of management strategies in the setting of marketing agreements. 
The objectives of this paper are twofold.  First, we use a theoretical model to explore a 
marketing agreement’s effect on farmers’ decisions. Second, we examine how the optimal 
monitoring policy varies with the level of constrained monitoring resources when farms are 
heterogeneous in terms of farm size.  
Our analysis is related to previous literature that addresses the economic implications 
of food certification programs. Fields of application concern both food safety and the 
environment. Examples include the role of labeling (Caswell and Padberg 1992; Crespi and 
Marette 2003; and Golan et al. 2001), financing methods for food safety certification (Crespi 
and Marette 2001), whether certification systems should be mandatory or voluntary 
(Segerson 1999), and the welfare impacts of certification policies (Zago and Pick 2004). 
Although all consider aspects of food certification, these studies make the assumption of 
perfect certification. Specifically, the approaches used consider that certification can 
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differentiate completely between high safety and low safety products. There are no low 
safety products in the high safety market. Under this assumption, the process of monitoring 
and enforcement is not considered explicitly. In contrast to these studies, our model allows 
for the existence of opportunistic behaviors. Monitoring effort plays an important role in 
detecting low safety foods disguised as high safety ones, and its inclusion leads to rather 
different conclusions regarding the market outcomes.    
Lack of information or asymmetric information in markets is a major source of market 
failure. Since the pioneering work of Akerlof (1970) and Klein and Leffler (1981), many 
studies have investigated the causes and remedies of market failures caused by asymmetric 
information on product quality. A variety of mechanisms have been proposed to identify the 
characteristics of products and to obtain suboptimal equilibria resulting from information 
problems. The mechanisms used include identification of price differences (Shapiro 1983), 
signaling and reputation (Kreps and Robert 1982; Shapiro 1983), and advertising (Nelson 
1970). These types of solutions, however, become problematic for food products which have 
credence qualities. More recent studies have considered the relationship between food safety 
and asymmetric information. For example, Elbasha and Riggs (1999) investigate the double 
moral hazard problem present in food markets. Fox and Hennessy (1999) examine the trade-
off between regulation of food quality control and economic damage. Carriquiry and 
Babcock (2004) develop a repeated purchase model to investigate the different choices of 
quality assurance systems for producers and the role of reputation. 
With asymmetric information, the ability to audit becomes important to the functioning 
of markets. This aspect has given rise to literature focusing on the problem of imperfect 
certification and the role of testing (Darby and Karni 1973; De and Nabar 1991; Polinsky and 
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Shavell 1992; and Starbird 1997). Starbird (2005) examines the impact of inspection policies 
on consumer and producer’s strategies using a principal-agent approach. Marette (2005) 
addresses the relationship between financing of enforcement and market structure. Mason 
and Sterbenz (1994) study the effects of an imperfect test of product quality on the strategies 
of producers and on how adverse selection affects market size. These papers lead to some 
interesting and different comparative static results for the effects induced by changes in test 
cost and accuracy compared with those of a perfect test.  
Especially relevant to our study are the studies that address how the possibility of fraud 
affects the producer’s behavior and choice of product. This includes whether mechanisms in 
markets may induce non fraudulent behaviors (Emons 1997; 2000), game-theoretic 
approaches to making false claims on product quality (McCluskey 2000), and consequences 
of mislabeling for consumer behavior and welfare (Giannakas 2002). The certifiers’ role as 
intermediary between producers and consumers has also been explored in the certification 
problem (Biglaiser 1993; Lizzeri 1999; and Nunez 2001).  
Fruits and vegetables are different from the other certified (non-food) products in their 
inelastic supply in a short run. Our study of the marketing agreement and optimal monitoring 
policy extends extant literature by (1) examining the relationship between the producer’s 
behavior and optimal monitoring policies when monitoring resources are limited; and (2) 
incorporating into our model the probability of a food safety failure and losses due to 
traceback. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model 
and presents the results of the monitoring policy’s effect on farmers’ behaviors under an 
endogenous detection rate. In Section 3 we develop the optimal monitoring policy for farms 
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with different size. Section 4 provides results from simulations. And finally, Section 5 
includes conclusions and summary discussion.  
 
2.2 Background and Model Setup 
Our analysis is built around the case of a market framework which consists of a 
continuum of farms with a single food product. In the second stage, these farms join an 
industrial marketing agreement voluntarily and commit themselves to adopt GAPs on a 
regular basis to meet the requirements of the auditing agency. In the first stage, the 
monitoring agency decides its auditing strategies. When individual farms choose whether to 
participate in the marketing agreement or not, they weigh their private benefit and cost. Price 
premiums are a tangible revenue-based incentive for farms to adopt GAPs. However, there is 
no evidence to indicate that farms can receive higher prices even if they are certified. While 
direct subsidies provide a direct incentive for farmers to adopt GAPs, experience has shown 
that they may create a supply response that distorts market signals and results in a budgetary 
burden for taxpayers.  
Two important motivations for farms to adopt GAPs are (i) to minimize the risk of 
potential market share losses and (ii) to reduce the probability of food incidents. With 
respect to the first motivation, an outbreak incident may have severe impacts on market share 
and prices of a food item associated with the outbreak. Processors or retailers seek farms that 
have participated in the marketing agreement although they need not pay more for the food. 
For example, in 2003 after hepatitis A outbreaks in the United States associated with green 
onions from Mexico, the sales of those growers who were not GAPs compliant declined to 
about half the normal volume, while shipments of growers with third-party audits of 
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compliance with GAPs fell just a bit (Calvin et al. 2004). With respect to the second 
motivation, applying GAPs can help farms to increase the level of food safety and hence 
reduce the chance of being linked with a failure or outbreak incident. Farms are interested in 
both the level of their revenue and its stability over time. Reducing uncertainty over market 
access assists in stabilizing revenues over the long-run. 
 
2.2.1 Supply and size 
To start, farms are assumed to be homogeneous and the total number of the farms is n . 
The more complex and realistic case that the farms are heterogeneous will be discussed in 
next section. Let y  denote farm size in terms of its productive capacity. Farm size is 
determined by the numbers of acres and the yield per acre, i.e., y  implies the maximum 
output of a farm. We assume that the output level chosen by a farmer is his or her 
predetermined farm size y  in this study. As Johnson and colleagues (2006) indicated, it is 
difficult for a farmer to change the level of output in a short run as far as many agronomic 
and economic constraints are concerned. These constraints may include investing in 
irrigation and capital investment, hiring more expensive labor to harvest the crop, and 
developing marketing contacts with processors, etc. Therefore, the total supply of the product 
is ny  which is exogenous in the current market period. The more complicated case that 
supply response changes in the long run are not considered in this analysis.  
 
2.2.2 Monitoring 
The strength of the farmer’s incentive to invest in GAPs is highly dependent on the  
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ability of the monitoring agency to separate GAP and non-GAP produce. Markets do not 
always work smoothly for all goods. Imperfect information, which exists when buyers and 
farmers cannot identify certain characteristics of a product, may reduce the farmer’s 
incentive to adopt GAPs by hindering the development of different levels of food safety. 
Thus, the provision of credible third party monitoring is crucial to the success of a marketing 
agreement.  
The delineation between private and public monitoring agency has become blurred. In 
the United States, many auditing agencies are established by an industry association, like the 
Western Growers, for individual product sectors. The federal government agencies such as 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
also act as the third party verifier to carry out on-farm audits.  A third party may monitor the 
level of safety effort that the farm implements through inspections of individual farms. We 
assume the farms participating in monitoring do not generate any externalities on the non-
participants. Once committed to a third party agreement, the farm can choose an effort level 
to meet standards on improving food safety.  
 
2.2.3 Detection and market effects 
We assume that safety control is not error-free. If a farm is selected for testing, the 
level of safety effort is only partly observable in the results the farm has implemented. Let 
( )0 1ρ ρ< ≤  denote the fixed detection rate of not meeting safety standards. The rate ρ  is 
the conditional probability of detection given that a monitoring event occurs, and it can be 
considered as detection efficiency. Higher ρ  means easier detection. We treat ρ  as common 
knowledge and assume it is same for all farms. Moreover, the detection probability of non 
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compliance with GAPs decreases with the safety effort that the farm has exerted.  Parameter 
[ ]0,1ω ∈  is a measure of the monitoring probability selected by the monitoring agency and it 
is assumed to have linear, negative relationship with the effort level θ . Therefore, ( )1ρω θ−  
is the true probability that non-compliance is detected.  
Once a food incident happens, the final consumers’ demand will be affected. The 
negative consequences of a food safety problem affect the industry in a collective way. 
Linear equation ( ) ( )( )0 1 1gD d d p h ε= − −  is specified to represent the demand for the 
product, where gp  denotes the grower’s price and ε  denotes the possibility of a food 
incident. The impact of the shock on the demand is captured by ( )h ε , where ( )' 0h ε > . The 
equilibrium price gp  can be solved for by the market clearing process D ny= . The 
effectiveness of the marketing agreement depends on how it can reduce the outbreak 
possibilityε and its severity. We assume ( )ε ε θ= , implying that the probability of an 
incident is determined by the average effort level applied in implementing GAPs in the 
market. The average effort level θ  is assumed to be exogenous and the farms take it as 
given. All farms can benefit from the marketing agreement by increasing the average level of 
safety effort in the market and reducing the possibility of food-related risks and the negative 
demand shock that would follow. 
Consider the simplest possible case in which inspection has two possible realizations: 
the farm either passes an inspection test on compliance with GAPs to get grower’s price gp
or fails the test. If a safety failure is detected, the farm will lose its entire market share. 
Chalfant et al. (2002) indicated that high safety vegetables and fruits are sold for fresh 
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consumption, whereas low safety produce is diverted for manufacturing uses and can only 
get the diverted price. We denote pp  as the diverted price.  Note that pp may be zero if the 
product cannot be sold. We measure the price difference p , gp  relative to pp , by defining
g pp p p= − . The substitution of the demand function in prices p  and 'p  leads to the 
expected price difference 
                
( ) ( ) ( )( )0' 0
1 1
/ 1
1 1 p p
d ny hd nyp p p p p
d d
εε ε ε ε ⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞−= − + = − − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
          (2.1) 
where p  and 
'p  imply the price difference under the case of an incident and no incident, 
respectively. Based on the above assumptions, the representative farmer’s expected revenue 
can be expressed as 
( )(1 )pTR p p p yρω θ= + − −                                                (2.2) 
which means the true market value to the farmer of growing one unit of product is the 
expected market price minus the loss from a detection failure.  
 
2.2.4 Costs 
Under the marketing agreement, the costs of an individual farm include two parts. The 
first part is production costs which are not dependent on safety effort. In reality, production 
costs include both fixed costs and variable costs. Fixed costs include mainly machinery 
ownership costs and some labor costs. The labor that is accounted for a fixed cost is supplied 
by the operator, family, or it is permanent hired labor. The variable costs include expenses on 
seed, fertilizer, chemicals, fuel, insurance, and variable (hourly) labor. The production cost is 
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assumed to subject to the rule of diminishing returns for production and is specified as a 
quadratic form 2 / 2ac y . 
The second part is compliance costs for GAPs which include recurrent and non-
recurrent costs. The major components of non-recurrent costs are investments in harvesting 
and storage equipment, energy and waste management or investments to improve farmer 
worker safety. The recurrent compliance costs mainly include higher labor requirements such 
as training workers to improve hygiene in the fields, upgrading recordkeeping systems, etc.  
Survey results (Chemnitz 2007, Wood et al. 2005) suggest that large farms benefit from 
economies of scale in terms of compliance costs.  
We specify compliance costs in a form similar to that proposed by Marette (2007), 
2( )c y yθ , where ( )c y  represents the marginal compliance cost and depends on farm size y . 
Individual farms also take into account costs related to traceback in the case of an incident. 
For example, the E. coli outbreak in 2006 was quickly traced to the farms in San Benito or 
Monterey County in California. Once a farm is identified as producing unsafe product, it 
causes an additional cost per unit of value f  which includes the direct cost of liability, 
product recalls, market-imposed penalties and other fines levied due to a safety outbreak. Let 
( )1z θ−  be the probability of being identified as a possible source when an incident happens, 
where z  is exogenous and can be treated as traceability efficiency.  
Obviously, higher safety effort level reduces the chance of being identified as a source 
and taking responsibility. Thus, the overall cost of traceback for an individual farm is
( )1f z yε θ− . Taking the assumption that the total costs are completely separable, the total 
cost of the farm to participate in the marketing agreement is expressed as  
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( ) ( )2 2 / 2 1aTC c y y c y f z yθ ε θ= + + −                                    (2.3) 
The farmer takes inspection rate ω  and output y  as given and supplies θ  to maximize 
his or her expected profit. Suppose for the moment that the monitoring agency does not 
engage in monitoring and enforcement activities ( )0ω = . The farmer is not afraid of being 
caught as not complying with GAPs, but he is still afraid of having unsafe produce traced 
back to his or her operation. The optimal amount of safety effort can be determined as
( )/ 2n f z c yθ ε= , which means the farmer adopts GAPs voluntarily to reduce food-borne 
risk even in the absence of monitoring. Under the environment of monitoring, the farmer can 
determine the probability that the production process meets the requirements of GAPs. The 
optimal level of effort invested by the farm is 
( )* 2
p f z
c y
ρω εθ +=
                                                       
 (2.4) 
We can find that the farmer exerts more effort with monitoring compared with the case 
without monitoring, i.e., * nθ θ> . Equation (2.2)-(2.4) indicate that the increase in safety effort 
generates two opposing effects.  On one hand, it increases expected revenue by enhancing the 
chance for passing the on-farm examination and reducing the probability of being traced with 
a safety problem; on the other hand, the increase of safety effort brings higher compliance 
cost.  
With the increase in monitoring rate, the farmer implements more safety effort. Thus 
the monitoring activities have a deterrent effect on fraudulent behavior. From equation (2.4), 
the necessary monitoring rate to guide the farm to achieve perfect compliance is  
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( )
1
2c y f z
p
εω ρ
−=                                                       (2.5) 
What we should mention here is that full compliance production can be obtained only 
if the exogenous detection satisfies ( )( )2 /c c y f z pρ ρ ε≥ = −  to guarantee that the 
inspection probability is less than 1.  
 
2.3 Farms differ in their size 
Farmers adopt GAPs if expected benefits exceed expected costs. However, not all 
farmers make the same decision with respect to production strategies. Once committed to an 
agreement, farmers would adopt different production decisions according to their individual 
characteristics. As relative returns change along with farm size, market conditions, 
technological advancement, or government policies, land use and safety investment patterns 
tend to adjust according. Among these factors, farm size is an important one that influences 
the farmer’s decision on safety effort level. In this study, we only consider heterogeneity in 
terms of farm size and assume that farms are homogenous in other factors.  
Concerns have been raised regarding the potential effect of GAPs on small farms. The 
fear is that strict requirements of GAPs could impose disproportionately higher cost on small 
farms and hence marginalize them. Meanwhile, due to the low demand for land and high 
labor requirements, the fruits and vegetable sector is often seen as a sector where small 
producers have a chance to participate. In this section we will examine the optimal type-
specific monitoring policy with endogenous detection on a fixed set of farms which are 
heterogeneous in terms of size.  
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Let yα  denote the level of farm size. Parameter α  reflects differences in size and is 
assumed to be a continuous index and distributed over the interval [ ],α α  according to 
density function ( )g α  and distribution function ( )G α , with ( ) 0G α =  and ( ) 1G α = . Let
( )c yα  represent the marginal compliance costs which include non-recurrent costs and 
marginal recurrent costs. 
Recall the previous discussion that the supply elasticity of fruits and vegetables is zero 
in the short run; each farmer chooses to harvest all his planted land yα . If there is no 
constraint on monitoring resources, the maximum high-safety production in the whole market 
is ( ) ( )Y yg dααα α α α= ∫ . The farm with parameterα will achieve perfect compliance ( )1θ =
if and only if the monitoring probability is higher or equal to ( ) ( )1 2c y f zp
α εω α ρ
−= . We 
normalize the unit cost of inspection to be one, and then the necessary monitoring resource in 
terms of dollars to achieve ( )Y α  is 
( ) ( ) ( )1R g dααα ω α α α= ∫                                              (2.6)                       
To guide the farmers to invest in more safety effort, the monitoring agency should 
intensify the frequency of inspections on a farm. However, monitoring resources are not 
always large enough to cover the necessary monitoring costs to achieve ( )Y α .1Theoretically, 
the monitoring agency can impose a per unit user fee to cover expenditures for the 
                                                 
1 There are some studies have examined the financing method of food certification. According to Crespi and 
Marette (2001), certification costs can be financed through public action, i.e., a lump-sum tax by all tax payers 
or a user fee to the farms who participate in the certification program. Because all taxation will create fiscal 
distortion and result in economic inefficiency, the tax rate for the certification cannot be too high in order to 
avoid large opportunity costs. In this case, the collected tax may not cover the compliance cost. The more 
realistic and efficient financing method is to collect per-unit user fee for all certified product.  
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administration of this agreement. However, a high certification fee may harm many small 
scale farms and drive them out of the market. Thus, a more modest certification fee may be 
imposed that would allow the small farms to stay in the market and participate the marketing 
agreement. However, a small user fee may mean that monitoring costs cannot be covered. 
Further research on how to determine an efficient user fee would be useful to inform this 
question.  
In this paper, we take the monitoring resource as given and do not address the question 
of how the resource is decided. Thus, in addition to the relationship of monitoring effort and 
the production strategies discussed above, we are also interested in the question of how the 
monitoring agency should distribute monitoring effort among heterogeneous farms when 
resources are constrained.  Taking the farmer’s production strategies into account, we move 
now to the first stage and try to examine how the monitoring agency allocates the constrained 
enforcement resource efficiently among the farms. 
We should highlight the fact that the private incentive to invest in food safety does not 
reflect the industry wide or public benefit of these actions. In other words, safety level 
choices that are optimal for an individual farm may not be optimal for society. In the case 
specified here, we assume that  the monitoring agency’s objective is to maximize producers’ 
surplus which is defined by the sum of all the producers’ profits. An alternative objective 
would be to obtain the maximum food safety given the agency budget constraint. The 
marketing agreement discussed here is initialized by an industry group.  
Without heterogeneity in farm size, there is no advantage to discriminate among the 
farms in monitoring effort and it is meaningless to study efficient strategies to allocate 
resources. Two identical farms would be inspected with the same probability. However, if 
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two farms of different size are audited with the same probability and the same enforcement 
effort is applied to each, the amounts of the safety level they choose will be different. Thus, 
when the farms differ, the agency has an incentive to discriminate among farms.  
The auditing costs depend on the testing practices, labor requirements, operation size 
and the other factors. If the monitoring agency’s resource is large enough to obtain full 
compliance, i.e., ( )R R α≥ , then all farms are audited with probability ( )1ω α . If the 
monitoring resource is not enough to cover ( )R α , given that the monitoring agency’s 
resource is just exhausted, the rule for distributing the monitoring effort is given in the next 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. When ( )R R α< , the general rule of allocating inspection resources is that the 
total amount of decreased fraud in terms of safety effort should be same for all the farms. 
 ( ) ( )* *1 1  j j k ky yθ α θ α− − = − −
 
Proof: see Appendix A.1. 
 
The result has strong policy implications: when the monitoring agency does not have 
necessary resources to achieve the socially optimal output, it should use size differences 
among the farms to guide the decision about distributing monitoring effort among the farms. 
The result indicates that the total amount of decreased fraud in terms of safety effort 
( )1 yθ αΕ = − −  should be same for all farms. Farm size has two opposing effects: (1) a size 
effect, and (2) a cost effect. The size effect means that larger farms imply a larger absolute 
value of Ε , and should be allocated more audits. The cost effect implies that smaller farms 
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have higher compliance costs and more incentive to shirk on effort. Intuitively, smaller farms 
can be easily deterred with stricter monitoring. Thus, the necessary monitoring rate to obtain 
same safety level for small farms is lower than for large farms, and the monitoring agency 
should apply more intense monitoring effort to farms with smaller size. 
 
Corollary 1. The optimal auditing probability for small farms increases faster than that for 
large farms with an increase of monitoring resources. When *R R≤  the agency first inspects 
farms with larger size; when *R R>  the agency first inspects farms with smaller size, where
( )* 4 / 2 /jkk j
k j
R p f z p
c c
ααα α ρ ε ρ⎛ ⎞= − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, ( )i ic c yα=  and k jα α>  .  
Proof: see Appendix A.2. 
 
When monitoring resources are not large enough and less than *R , the size effect 
dominates and smaller farms will be inspected with a lower rate or may not even be inspected 
at all. With the increase of monitoring resources, the cost effect becomes stronger and size 
effect becomes weaker. After *R R> , the cost effect dominates and the allocated monitoring 
rate is higher for smaller farms. Because all farms’ allocated monitoring rate is less or equal 
to ( )1ω α , they will make some effort to enhance food safety.  Corollary 2 complements the 
proposition by stating the existence of the fact. 
 
Corollary 2. The size effect and cost effect of audits always have opposite signs. 
This fact implies that the changing patterns of monitoring rates for heterogeneous 
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farms are robust. 
Proof: see Appendix A.3.  
 
2.4 Simulation analysis 
We now construct a simulation model to illustrate our comparative statics results for 
the fresh strawberries market in California. California supplies more than 85 percent of the 
total market for fresh strawberries and leads the country in yield per acre (Woods et al. 
2005). The main objective in using this example is to examine how monitoring strategies and 
farm behavior for providing safety effort are affected by alternative plausible values of farm 
size. It is assumed that if the products are detected as failing the safety criteria or practices, 
they will be sold in the processed market instead of fresh market. Once a farm has been 
linked to an outbreak of foodborne illness, it causes an additional cost. Given the values of 
parameters, the optimal inspection rate ω  depends on compliance costs of GAPs and farm 
size. Since compliance costs are also determined by farm size, the differences of inspection 
rate among the farms can be said to rely on farm size. We treat ω  as a parameter to be 
solved, for various settings of the other parameters. 
The prices for fresh and processed strawberry in California in the year of 2004 are 
equal to 77.3 and 24.9 cents per pound, respectively. Thus the price difference p  for fresh 
product relative to processed product is 52.4 cents per pound. With monitoring activities, the 
chance of a food accident is assumed to be 0.02 and the incident will lead to a 10 percent 
reduction in demand. Using historical data for the California fresh strawberry market from 
year 1989 through year 2006 adjusted to 2004 dollars, we estimate the demand curve as
911 315.2 gD p= − . Based on the assumption that the supply elasticity is zero in a short run, 
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the grower’s price is estimated to drop to 53.8 cents per pound with an incident. Moreover, 
we assume the additional cost of the firm’s failure is equal to the grower’s price following a 
shock. Table 2.1 summarizes the values of parameters used in this example. 
Table 2.1. Parameters used in the example 
Parameter Value
gp 77.3 (cents) 
'
gp 53.8 (cents) 
pp 24.9 (cents) 
p  52.4 (cents) 
'p  28.9 (cents) 
f  53.8 (cents) 
ε  0.02 
( )h ε  0.10 
ρ  1.00 
z  0.10 
 
Five main GAPs are used to represent what a typical strawberry farmer may adopt in 
the stage of implementation based on a study of GAP costs in fresh strawberries from the 
report of Woods and Thornsbury (2005).The costs of all the GAPs are listed in Table 2.2.   
For the GAP related to packing and cooling practices, the costs of cleaning the holding 
shed or cooling pad are the primary expenses. Typical costs include weekly cleaning and 
maintenance of the shed which require two hours of labor for an average size farm (recurrent 
costs) and cleaning supplies including a sanitizer (non-recurrent cost) (Wood et al. 2005). 
Smaller growers need to invest on a single use system which is about $364 per acre. 
However, large growers do not have to purchase single-use trays since most strawberries 
moving into the retail market are field packed directly into plastic clamshells or other single 
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use containers. Thus, the average compliance costs for smaller farms are higher than that for 
larger farms for this practice.  
Table 2.2. Cost of Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs)   
Farm size (acres) 4.8 30 47 
GAPs cost (cents/lb)    
1. Toilet and hand washing facilities 0.08691 0.21349 0.21349 
2. Hygiene Training 0.02267 0.04345 0.04156 
3. Packing shed and cooling pad 
sanitation and single use trays for u-
picks 
0.15681 0.03401 0.04534 
4. Monitoring irrigation water 0.01322 0.00945 0.00567 
5. Developing a crisis management 
plan 0.26450 0.04723 0.03023 
6. Certification fee 0.33333 0.33333 0.33333 
Total 0.87744 0.68095 0.45802 
Source: Woods and Thornsbury, 2005.  
 
The main expenses of the other three practices (practices 2, 4 and 5) are labor costs. 
Labor rate and the time required for each of these GAPs can be used to estimate the 
compliance costs. The average labor rate is higher for large growers. As example, the wage 
rate for a hired employee and an operator in large farms is $9.61 and $12.51, respectively, 
while the wage rate is $7.56 and $9.78 for small farms. From Table 2.2, smaller growers 
spend less in hygiene training and more in per unit costs of monitoring irrigation water and 
developing the crisis management plan. In these cases, their benefit from lower labor rates is 
less than their loss from economies of scale. Finally, the cost of third party certification is 
about 0.3 cents per pound and does not vary with farm size. With costs as in Table 2.2, 
smaller farms have higher compliance costs compared with larger farms. 
Table 2.3 summarizes the simulation results on critical points (the complete results are 
presented in appendix Table 2.4). We assume there are only three types of farms in the 
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market (large=47 acres, medium=30 acres and small=4.8 acres) and each size type has same 
number of farms. For simplicity, we assume the number of farms in each type to be 1, an 
assumption which will not change the implications of simulation results  
Table 2.3. Simulation results on monitoring resources with critical points, R 
R  c  y  ω  θ  
0.0050  0.46  47 0.0050  0.4034 
  0.68  30 0 0.0808 
  0.88  4.8 0  0.0627 
0.0186  0.46  47 0.0093  0.6470 
  0.68  30 0.0093  0.4351 
  0.88  4.8 0  0.0627 
0.0340  0.46  47 0.0140  0.9133 
  0.68  30 0.0203  0.8543 
  0.88  4.8 0  0.0627 
0.0517  0.46  47 0.0148  0.9586 
  0.68  30 0.0222  0.9267 
  0.88  4.8 0.0148 0.5006 
0.0616 0.46  47 0.0152  0.9813 
  0.68  30 0.0232  0.9648 
  0.88  4.8 0.0232  0.7492 
0.0670  0.46  47 0.0155  1.0000 
  0.68  30 0.0238  0.9877 
  0.88  4.8 0.0277  0.8823 
0.0700 0.46  47 0.0155 1.0000 
 0.68  30 0.0241 1.0000 
 0.88  4.8 0.0304 0.9622 
0.0713  0.46  47 0.0155  1.0000 
  0.68  30 0.0241  1.0000 
  0.88  4.8 0.0317  1.0000 
 
We denote by R the monitoring resources (per pound) that the agency can devote to 
testing. The cost of one test is normalized to be one. For each choice of marginal compliance 
costs c and farm size y , we report inspection rate ω  and safety effort θ .   
Figure 2.1 shows the patterns of optimal inspection rate for each type of farm given  
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different levels of monitoring resources. The simulation results indicate that the optimal 
inspection rate is an increasing function of monitoring resources. With the increase of 
monitoring resources, the optimal inspection rate for each type of farm increases but with 
different speeds. Smaller farms have a higher increasing rate compared to the larger farms, a 
result which is coincident with the proposition above.            
 
Figure 2.1. Optimal inspection rates with different monitoring resources 
 
When monitoring resources are relatively low, the monitoring agency spends all its 
resources on the large farms. The small and medium farms are not inspected until point A 
(R=0.005) – a point with very low monitoring resources; the size effect is dominant in this 
region. The inspection probability of the medium farm increases faster than that of the large 
farm and at point B (R=0.0186) the two farms are audited with same probability 0.0093. 
From then on, the medium farm faces higher inspection rate than the large farm, and the cost 
effect is more significant compared with size effect. From point C (R=0.034), all farms are 
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inspected but the small farm is inspected with the lowest probability until point D (R=0.052). 
At point D, the inspection rates for the large farm and the small farm are equal. When the 
monitoring resource is higher than 0.052 (point D) and lower than 0.062 (point E), the 
monitoring rate for the small farm is higher than the larger farm but is still lower than the 
medium farm. At point E, the auditing rate for the medium farm and the small farm is same 
(= 0.023).  With an increase of monitoring resources, the cost effect of monitoring becomes 
dominant for the small farm. After point E, the inspection rate has a negative relationship 
with farm size. In this region, increased costs of monitoring food safety effort are associated 
with a lower level of effort and more easily detected fraudulent behavior in production 
practices. Thus the necessary monitoring rate to deter fraud decreases. 
Correspondingly, the safety effort of the farms changes with their inspection rate. The 
necessary auditing probability needed to attain full compliance level ( 1θ = ) is higher for 
smaller farms. When 0.067R = (point F), the large farm will be inspected with probability 
0.0155 and can be induced to exert full effort; the other farms may still shirk their efforts to 
invest in food safety practices. After point G ( 0.070R = ), both the medium and the large 
farms will achieve full compliance. After 0.071R = (point H), all farms produce with full 
compliance.  
        
2.5 Conclusions 
This paper provides insight on how and under what conditions, monitoring activities 
might mitigate the fraudulent activities of food growers under a voluntary marketing 
agreement. We handled the effect of food safety failure by incorporating the probability of a 
foodborne illness outbreak into our model. A farm loses from the “bad outcome” by 
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receiving diverted price and/or through traceback being linked with the incident. Our analysis 
brings out the following results. 
 First, we show that the farms respond to monitoring and enforcement by increasing 
safety effort up until perfect compliance is achieved. Meanwhile, farms adopt GAPs 
voluntarily to reduce their food-borne risk even in absence of monitoring; Second, optimal 
monitoring policy depends on the exogenous size parameter of the farms. If the monitoring 
resource is not enough to cover the necessary inspection costs of achieving optimal safety 
level, the agency will discriminate among farms to maximize total producers’ surplus. The 
general rule of allocating inspection resource is that the total amount of decreased fraud in 
terms of safety effort for each farm is same. We find when auditing resources are very low, 
the size effect is dominant and larger farms will be inspected first; when the resources are 
large enough, the cost effect is dominant and the agency will target small farms first. The 
optimal auditing probability for small farms has a larger rate of increase than for large farms; 
the size effect and cost effect cannot have same sign. 
There are also several possible extensions for future work. First, we analyze the 
optimal monitoring policy under the case that all farms are all risk neutral and have same risk 
preference. A more complicated analysis could be developed when the risk preferences are 
different. Second, the monitoring resource is assumed to be exogenous in our model. A 
meaningful extension would be to examine the design of efficient user-fee scheme in a 
second-best policy setting. Third, the industry’s response to food safety failure seems to be 
dynamic, taking into account the interplay of monitoring policies and the probability of a 
food incident. More explicit consideration of dynamic response may lead to interesting 
implications. Fourth, farm size and size distribution are assumed to be predetermined in this 
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study. This assumption is relatively restrictive, but is likely the case in the short run for the 
produce industry with relatively high capital investments. In the longer run, farms may 
contemplate existing the industry. Since more supermarkets now require their farms to pass a 
GAPs audit. If the costs associated with implementing GAPs have a disproportionate impact 
on smaller farms, the higher costs and requirements of the GAPs may lead to the exit of the 
smaller farms from the industry.  A useful extension of this research would be to allow the 
size distribution of farms to change with food safety regulation. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1 
The expected return of a farm is: 
( )( )1p i i iTR p p p yρω θ α= + − −                                       (A1) 
 where ( ) '1p p pε ε= − +                              
The total cost of the farm is: 
  ( ) ( )22 / 2 1i i a i i iTC c y c y f z yθ α α ε θ α= + + −                         (A2)          
where ( )i ic c yα=                
The optimal effort level implemented by the farm is 
i
max i TR TCθ π = −                                                       (A3)                         
Then we get
 
*
2
i
i
i
p f z
c
ρω εθ +=
                                                     
(A4)                         
Profit iπ is derived as 
  
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 / 2
4
j
i p j i a i
i
p f z
p p p f z y c y
c
ρω επ ρω ε α α
⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟= + − + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠           
(A5)                 
 
Let us now consider two farms, k  and  j, such that k jα α> . With limited resources the 
agency seeks to maximize the producers’ total surplus 
i
      max  s.t.      ,i i
i i
R i k jω π ω ≤ =∑ ∑                                      (A6)                         
The first order necessary conditions can be written as 
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* *
1 1   
2 2
j k
j k
j k
p f z p f zy y
c c
ρω ε ρω εα α⎛ ⎞+ ⎛ ⎞+− + = − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠                      
(A7)                         
Plug (A4) into (A7), we can get 
( ) ( )* *1 1  j j k ky yθ α θ α− − = − −                                     (A8)                         
 
A.2. Proof of Corollary 1 
We denote j jy yα=  and k ky yα= . From the objective function (A6) and the first order 
condition (A7), the optimal monitoring rate of the farms can be derived as:  
* 2
2
j j k
k k j
j j k
y y yf zA R y y
c p c c
εω ρ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= + − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠                            (A9 )                         
* 2
2
jk k
j k j
k j k
yy yf zA R y y
c p c c
εω ρ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
where 1/ j k
j k
y yA
c c
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Since 
**
j jk k
j k
y yA A
R c c R
ωω ∂∂ = < =∂ ∂ , the optimal auditing probability for the small farm 
increases faster than that for the large farm.
 
Correspondingly,              
( )2 4j kk j k j
j k
y y f zA R y y
c c p p
εω ω ρ ρ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− = − + + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
                      (A10)                     
Since k jy y> , if ( )* *, 4 / 2 /jkk j
k j
R R R p f z p
c c
ααα α ρ ε ρ⎛ ⎞< = − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, then 0k jω ω− > ,  
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which means the agency first inspects farms with larger size; If *R R> , 0k jω ω− < , which 
means the agency first inspects farms with smaller size. 
 
A.3. Proof of Corollary 2 
From (A10) and k jy y> , we know size effect ( )4 0k jy ypρ − > . If size effect has same sign 
with cost effect, then  j k
j k
y y
c c
>
 
should be satisfied. Since j kc c> , /j jy c  is always less than
/k ky c , size effect and cost effect always have opposite signs. 
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Table 2.4. Simulation results on monitoring policies  
ω  ( )47yω = ( )30yω =  ( )4.8yω =  
0 0 0 0 
0.001 0.00100 0 0 
0.002 0.00200 0 0 
0.003 0.00300 0 0 
0.004 0.00400 0 0 
0.005 0.00500 0 0 
0.006 0.00550 0.00050 0 
0.007 0.00580 0.00120 0 
0.008 0.00610 0.00190 0 
0.009 0.00640 0.00260 0 
0.010 0.00670 0.00330 0 
0.011 0.00700 0.00400 0 
0.012 0.00730 0.00470 0 
0.013 0.00760 0.00540 0 
0.014 0.00790 0.00610 0 
0.015 0.00820 0.00680 0 
0.016 0.00850 0.00750 0 
0.017 0.00880 0.00820 0 
0.018 0.00910 0.00890 0 
0.019 0.00940 0.00960 0 
0.020 0.00970 0.01030 0 
0.021 0.01000 0.01100 0 
0.022 0.01030 0.01170 0 
0.023 0.01060 0.01240 0 
0.024 0.01090 0.01310 0 
0.025 0.01120 0.01380 0 
0.026 0.01150 0.01450 0 
0.027 0.01180 0.01520 0 
0.028 0.01210 0.01590 0 
0.029 0.01240 0.01660 0 
0.030 0.01270 0.01730 0 
0.031 0.01300 0.01800 0 
0.032 0.01330 0.01870 0 
0.033 0.01360 0.01940 0 
0.034 0.01399 0.02029 0 
0.035 0.01404 0.02039 0.00057 
0.036 0.01408 0.02050 0.00142 
0.037 0.01413 0.02060 0.00227 
0.038 0.01418 0.02071 0.00312 
0.039 0.01422 0.02081 0.00397 
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Table 2.4. (Continued)
ω  ( )47yω = ( )30yω =  ( )4.8yω =  
0.040 0.01427 0.02092 0.00482 
0.041 0.01431 0.02102 0.00567 
0.042 0.01436 0.02113 0.00652 
0.043 0.01440 0.02123 0.00736 
0.044 0.01445 0.02134 0.00821 
0.045 0.01449 0.02145 0.00906 
0.046 0.01454 0.02155 0.00991 
0.047 0.01458 0.02166 0.01076 
0.048 0.01463 0.02176 0.01161 
0.049 0.01467 0.02187 0.01246 
0.050 0.01472 0.02197 0.01331 
0.051 0.01476 0.02208 0.01416 
0.052 0.01481 0.02218 0.01501 
0.053 0.01485 0.02229 0.01586 
0.054 0.01490 0.02239 0.01671 
0.055 0.01494 0.02250 0.01756 
0.056 0.01499 0.02261 0.01841 
0.057 0.01504 0.02271 0.01925 
0.058 0.01508 0.02282 0.02010 
0.059 0.01513 0.02292 0.02095 
0.060 0.01517 0.02303 0.02180 
0.061 0.01522 0.02313 0.02265 
0.062 0.01526 0.02324 0.02350 
0.063 0.01531 0.02334 0.02435 
0.064 0.01535 0.02345 0.02520 
0.065 0.01540 0.02355 0.02605 
0.066 0.01544 0.02366 0.02690 
0.067 0.01549 0.02377 0.02775 
0.068 0.01549 0.02388 0.02864 
0.069 0.01549 0.02399 0.02953 
0.070 0.01549 0.02410 0.03042 
0.071 0.01549 0.02410 0.03142 
0.072 0.01549 0.02410 0.03170 
0.073 0.01549 0.02410 0.03170 
0.074 0.01549 0.02410 0.03170 
0.075 0.01549 0.02410 0.03170 
0.076 0.01549 0.02410 0.03170 
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CHAPTER 3. FOOD SAFETY, TRACEABILITY AND CONTRACT 
DESIGN 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Recent outbreaks of food-borne illness related to fruit and vegetables have led to 
increased concerns about food safety and its effect on human health. Fruits and vegetables 
are typically grown outdoors and are vulnerable to contamination in the natural environment 
or in handling and processing after harvest. In order to prevent such contamination, great care 
should be taken to improve food safety on farm level. For example, many fruit and vegetable 
industries have identified specific Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs) for adoption by 
growers at critical production steps to reduce contamination that leads to food safety failures. 
Many retail and foodservice buyers now require food suppliers to adhere to some 
performance-based standards or specific criteria for product control and monitoring. As a 
result, processors now place a higher value on purchasing safe products from their growers 
than before. Direct relationships with growers are being established on the basis of delivering 
high safety products and have enabled processors to become much more involved than before 
in the production practices. 
Processors seek to maintain an adequate stream of product to meet production 
schedules and maintain a low probability of contamination. Safer and higher quality inputs 
reduce economic losses associated with product recall, public health impacts and consumer’s 
distrust. In turn, growers seek income stability, market security as well as access to capital 
and technology. Contracts are used to coordinate exchanges in the production process and to 
provide contracting parties with a degree of control and risk sharing. Much of the fruit and 
vegetables industry is vertically coordinated in the United States and where 56.5 % of fruit 
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production and 30% of vegetable production is under marketing contracts (MacDonald et al. 
2004).  
The provisions of a basic processing fruit and vegetables production contract may 
include many issues, and the contracts differ substantially across the commodity sectors.  
Product quantity and quality usually play important roles in a contract. In some markets, 
contract payment to the grower depends only on measured quantity, while in other markets 
payment depends on both measured quantity and quality. In order to focus on the effects of 
quality on contract design, we assume that output is fixed in this research and thus exclude 
the influence of product quantity. 
Food quality is defined as the totality of features and characteristics of a product (ISO). 
Often quality can be graded by a third audit party through objective measurements based on 
its various physical attributes such as appearance, odor, taste, flavor, and nutrition. Grade 
standards describe the quality requirements for each grade of food products and give industry 
a common language for buying and selling. In the United States, the USDA Agricultural 
Marketing Service (USDA-AMS) provides grading services for fresh fruit and vegetables. 
Growers can improve product quality by investing in efforts by selection of seed and 
genetics, production and harvest practices and product management. 
Food safety is defined as the assurance that the food will not cause harm to consumers 
when it is prepared and/or eaten according to its intended use (FAO/WHO 1997). Food 
safety assurance involves reduction of risks which may occur in food products. To improve 
food safety and reduce contamination, growers should adopt good agricultural practices at 
various production steps. Those practices may include production site selection, fertilizer 
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usage, grower regulators, the use of veterinary drugs, water quality and usage, pest control, 
pesticide monitoring and harvesting practices.  
Although safety is a component of quality, it differs from many other quality attributes 
as it is often difficult or very costly to observe the safety outcome. A product can appear to 
be of high quality but may be unsafe because it is contaminated with undetected (below 
threshold level of detection) toxic chemicals or other contamination with low probability of 
detection (or very costly detection) in tests. At the same time, a product that seems to lack 
many of the visible quality attributes of high quality, such as uniformity in shape, may be 
safe. Thus, the payoff for higher levels of food safety is difficult to be contractible and the 
contracts usually do not include conditions on food safety. Instead, the processor is more 
likely to pay closer attention to food safety indicators and expect the grower to exert effort to 
assure food safety. However, the grower has incentive to shirk his effort on producing safe 
product because he or she can be insulated from the risks of social and personal cost of food-
borne problems because of the difficulty in product tracing.  
A potential way to provide the grower an incentive to exert the effort needed to 
produce safe product is by implementing traceability systems in food supply chains. With a 
traceability system in place, the source of unsafe products can more easily be identified. If a 
grower failing to provide a safe product is identified through traceback, he or she faces costs 
of failure such as penalties and/or market loss, and the processor faces losses associated with 
disrupted input supply or market loss due to the safety failure in the processed product. Thus 
the grower has greater incentive to exert high safety effort during his production process in 
order to diminish possible losses. In contrast, the processor can benefit from obtaining safer 
products due to the potential liability incurred by the grower in the case of a food safety 
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failure. The existence of traceability systems can be looked on as an indirect way for 
providing safety assurance and thus having such a system in place can enter into a contract 
with conditions designed to improve product safety. Although safety is a component of 
quality, safety improvement activities frequently are not included in quality improvement 
activities. In fact, activities on improving quality and safety may be independent, 
complementary, or substitutes in ensuring safety issues receive appropriate emphasis. 
Growers who accept a contract are expected to comply with all of the contract 
provisions. However, quality and safety information is not full or complete due to the 
stochastic nature of production. This means greater effort cannot guarantee higher quality 
and safer product, while reduced effort may generate high quality and safer product. The 
probability of growers exerting less efforts increases with the profits that can be earned 
through opportunistic behavior. Furthermore, the effects of a traceability system on 
mitigating food safety problems rely heavily on its efficiency. Food risks may be caused by 
poor food safety practices of the grower who knows his production processes but also know 
the difficulty of trace back to the specific firm. 
As a consequence, moral hazard may occur in both quality effort and safety effort. 
Consideration of the design of a marketing contract needs to account for the impact of both 
traceability as well as the distribution of payoffs between growers and processors.  The 
objectives of this paper are (1) to analyze the effects of marketing contracts on the behaviors 
of growers and processors; (2) to examine how the interaction between safety effort and 
quality effort influences the grower’s incentives and can help to overcome moral hazard 
problems; and (3) to identify how a traceability system affects contract provisions and 
mitigates the grower’s moral hazard problem. 
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3.2 Background  
 
Our analysis is related to previous literature that addresses economic implications of 
asymmetric information on the failure of agricultural markets. Since the pioneering work of 
Akerlof (1970) and Grossmann and Hart (1983), the bulk of the literature has considered the 
causes and remedies of agricultural market failures caused by asymmetric information on 
product quality and how moral hazard affects producers’ behavior and choice of product. For 
instance, Fraser (2002, 2004) shows that agri-environmental policy reduces the problem of 
moral hazard and finds a negative relationship between monitoring activities and the extent 
of fraudulent behaviors by participants. Hennessy et al. (2003) demonstrates the interaction 
between moral hazard and food safety as a result of systemic failure in the provision of safe 
food. Caswell et al. (1996) and Crespi et al. (2003) study the effects and role of certification 
on overcoming adverse selection problems. Starbird (2005) investigates the consequences of 
inspection policy on food safety and welfare. 
Many studies have been conducted to analyze how a traceability system can encourage 
more food safety efforts and mitigate food-safety related risks as an incentive mechanism. 
Golan et al. (2004) discuss the implementation of traceability systems in the US and analyzes 
the motivations for producers to adopt a tractability system. Starbird (2008) constructs a 
model to analyze the influence of a traceability system on the provision of safe products by 
incorporating traceability error, sampling error and diagnostic error into the supplier’s utility 
function. Hirschauer and Musshoff (2007) use a game-theoretic approach to address the 
effects of incomplete inspection on tracing food risks. McEvoy and Monteiro (2008) 
investigate to what extent an industry voluntary agreement on food traceability can reduce 
the cost of food-safety related problems. Filho (2007) studies the effects of a traceability 
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system on the raw material supplier’s willingness to implement food safety effort. Resende-
Filho and Buhr (2008) develop a principal-agent model to examine the optimal expected 
traceback probability in US fed cattle sector. Souza Monteiro and Caswell (2010) present a 
network model to analyze the choice of voluntary traceability systems for multi-ingredient 
foods. In general, the studies show that improved product tracing motivates producers to 
deliver safer food, and improves product safety through market based incentives.  
The general contract perspective has been applied to a variety of incentive problems. 
Especially relevant to our study are those that address how the marketing contract between 
processors and growers affects agricultural production. Several studies have explored the 
effects of contracting using theoretical and empirical approaches. Olesen (2003) analyzes the 
interaction between the theory and the practice of contracting with heterogeneous growers. 
Goodhue (2000) examines the impacts of input control and grower heterogeneity on efficient 
contract design by using a moral hazard-adverse selection approach. Weaver and Kim (2000) 
demonstrate the potential benefits of supply chain management strategies that use contracts 
to improve food quality in the supply chain. Ligon (2004) develops an efficient contract 
which takes account of stochastic production functions from experimental data. Hueth et al. 
(2002, 2004) examine the relationship between moral hazard problem and contract design 
within the context of the fruit and vegetable industry. 
Although these studies assess the opportunity for supply chain contracting, they only 
consider the case where the agent performs one task and controls one-dimensional effort. 
None of these studies evaluates how efficient incentive-compatible contracts can be designed 
to induce both quality effort and safety effort and how the interaction between quality and 
safety efforts affects incentives. The contribution of this paper is twofold:  First, we examine 
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how incentive considerations affect the optimal mix of efforts along each dimension of the 
grower’s performance. Second, we establish the link between contract design and the 
traceability system. In particular, we analyze how the grower’s behavior decisions are 
affected by the rate (frequency) of traceability and the effects of traceability on the contract 
price mechanism.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 constructs a benchmark 
model in which a traceability system is absent and develops the baseline analytical results. In 
the next two sections, contract designs with observable safety effort (section 3) and 
unobservable safety effort (section 4) in the case of a traceability system are examined, 
respectively.  Section 5 provides results from a numerical experiment, and section 6 provides 
summary of the findings and conclusions.  
 
3.3 Model Setup and the Strategic Environment  
 
The strategic interaction between the processor and the grower proceeds as follows. 
First the processor designs and proposes a contract. Second, the grower either accepts or 
rejects the contract. If the grower rejects the contract, then the game terminates and both 
parties get their respective reservation payoffs; if the grower accepts, the game moves on to 
the third stage where the grower chooses whether or not to invest high effort on quality and 
safety during the production process. Each grower’s level of effort on quality and safety is 
private information. At the end of the cropping season, the outputs are delivered to the 
processor, and food quality is measured. According to the signed contract, the processor pays 
the grower based on the product quality measurement. If a food safety problem is detected in 
following marketing stages and can be traced back to the responsible grower, the grower 
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incurs a penalty; if the grower cannot be identified, he does not face any extra costs at all. 
The following subsections outline the grower and processor’s problems under alternative 
conditions. 
 
3.3.1 Benchmark model - low safety effort is implemented 
In order to better understand the implications of the model, we construct a benchmark 
model in which the traceability system is absent. Our analysis is based on a monopolistic 
market framework which consists of multiple growers and one processor. In order to abstract 
from yield risk, we assume each grower produces a single unit of product. The processor 
designs a contract with growers specifying payments based on the measured quality of the 
food product. We assume that the economic value is not large enough for the processor to 
induce high effort in both tasks, i.e., the processor’s objective is to minimize the cost of 
inducing the growers to implement high effort on quality only. Without explicit incentive, the 
growers do not exert high effort level on food safety, for example, they do not implement 
Good Agricultural Practices during their production process. 
Though a grower’s choice of effort level is continuous, we restrict the effort levels to 
be a binary choice, High or Low. As a result, output quality can take only two values, High or 
Low. The quality level depends on the effort level chosen by the grower. However, the 
realized quality level is an imperfect signal of quality effort because despite efforts during 
production, many fruit and vegetables products are subject to random changes in quality such 
as stochastic deterioration during the time between shipment and delivery due to their 
perishable nature. In addition, the grading process at the delivery point is not completely 
accurate. Thus, this makes it is possible that the choice of effort stochastically determines the 
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grower’s output quality. The processor cannot observe the grower’s choice of effort on 
improving quality, but can observe the measured quality level at the delivery point. 
We define p  as the probability that high quality is realized at the delivery point when 
high quality effort and low safety effort are implemented during the production process. 
Consequently, ( )1 p−  is denoted as the probability of being measured as low quality with 
actual high quality effort. High quality effort leads to higher probability that high quality is 
realized, i.e., 0.5p > . It is assumed that the production technology of high quality product 
requires that inputs be employed in fixed proportions. The grower incurs cost on high quality 
effort, given by qϕ .  
The processor is assumed to have preferences over lotteries that can be represented by 
a vonNeumann-Morgenstern utility function xU  for a grower, where x  denotes realized 
quality which can be high or low. For simplicity, the grower’s preference is additively 
separable in payment and effort cost, and is represented as ( ), q x qV x Uϕ ϕ= − . We introduce 
moral hazard by assuming that observing and monitoring the grower’s effort level on 
improved quality are prohibitively costly. Thus the processor has to offer the grower a 
contract such that compensation is based on observable output quality. However, the grower 
will only accept an offer from the processor if it yields at least his reservation payoff, which 
is normalized to be zero and perfectly certain. Thus, the participation constraint becomes 
        (1 ) 0h l qpU p U ϕ+ − − ≥                                                   (3.1) 
The risk neutral processor’s problem is to design a grower contract that induces the 
grower to take the best action from the processor’s point of view. That is, the goal of the 
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contract is to encourage the grower to deliver high quality products. We denote by pα  the 
probability that high quality is realized at the delivery point associated with low quality effort 
and low safety effort at the production process, and by 1 pα−  the probability that low 
quality is realized, where 0 1α< < . Parameter α reflects the likelihood of realizing high 
quality product given low quality effort relative to that given high quality effort. The 
processor designs contracts by choosing compensation, or equivalently ( ),h lU U . The 
incentive compatibility constraint becomes 
( ) ( )1 1h l q h lpU p U pU p Uϕ α α+ − − ≥ + −                                   (3.2)                       
This constraint ensures that under the contract payment the grower’s optimal choice of the 
quality effort is high. This setting represents a fairly standard principal-agent contracting 
problem (see for example Laffont and Martimort 2001). 
We assume that each processed unit results in one unit output in this analysis. We also 
assume that the processor is aware of the grower’s utility function and the distribution of the 
grower’s effort level. For the processor, inducing high quality effort yields expected revenue
( )1h lB pS p S= + −  , where hS  and lS  are the monetary value the processor can get from the 
high quality product and the low quality product, respectively. We denote h  as payment to 
the grower and assume it has a quadratic expression ( ) 2
2
rh U U U= + , where r  can be 
considered as the grower’s degree of absolute risk aversion. This assumption ensures a 
closed-form solution and does not affect the qualitative results. The processor makes the 
expected payment made to the grower to induce a high quality effort ( ) ( ) ( )1h lC ph U p h U= + − .  
The processor chooses a payment scheme to minimize the expected compensation 
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 subject to the grower’s decision rule. Given the above assumptions, the optimal values of hU
and lU  can be derived from the following:  
                                                                ,
min
h lU U
C  
                                             Subject to: (3.1) and (3.2).     
For the simplest case of 0r = , we obtain the optimal payments to the grower directly 
by solving (3.1) and (3.2) with equalities:  
1
1
q
hU p
ϕ αα
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠                                                     
 (3.3)                       
1l q
U αϕ α= − −                                                           (3.4)                       
The processor makes an expected payment 
( ) ( ) ( )1h l qC ph U p h U ϕ= + − =  
The expected payment to the grower equals the grower’s the cost if the processor 
implements effort to improve quality himself. Thus, the processor can costlessly structure the 
grower’s payments so that the grower has incentive to exert high quality effort. As a general 
theme of agency theory, moral hazard is not a problem with a risk-neutral farmer despite the 
fact that the effort is unobservable. In summary, the first-best level of effort on improving 
quality can be implemented. 
When the farmer is risk-averse ( 0r > ), ( )h ⋅  is strictly convex and the processor’s 
objective function is strictly concave in ( hU , lU ). The constraints are linear and the interior 
of the constraint set is nonempty.  If we let ( )* *,h lU U  denote the maximized value of the 
payment, we can get optimal payments to the grower from:  
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( )*
1
1h q q
pU
p
ϕ ϕ α
−= + −                                                 
 (3.5)                       
* 1
1l q q
U ϕ ϕ α= − −  
                                                      (3.6)                       
(See Appendix B.1)
 
The payment to the grower consists of a fixed component, to ensure the grower accepts 
the compensation contract, and an incentive component that induces high effort on quality 
improvement. Obviously, * *h lU U> . The grower receives a premium of ( )
1
1q
p
p
ϕ α
−
−  
in terms 
of utility when quality is high and a penalty 1
1q
ϕ α−  when quality is low. From (3.5) and 
(3.6) we obtain the classical result that the optimal level of payment for high quality is a 
negative function of the spread ratio of probabilities 1 α− , while for low quality the payment 
is a positive function of 1 α− . The intuition behind this result is that the processor has less 
incentive to invest more to differentiate the products if the spread of probabilities is high. 
Moreover, it becomes harder for the grower to get a higher payment as p  increases.  
Let us turn to the question of the optimality of inducing a higher quality effort, from 
the processor’s point of view.  The expected payment to the grower can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( )* *1h lC ph U p h U= + −
 
                                            (3.7)                       
From (3.3) to (3.6), we can get 
( )
2 2
2
1
2 2 1
q q q
r r pC
p
ϕ ϕ ϕ α
−= + + −                                        
 (3.8)                       
The first two terms of the right-hand side of (3.8) are first-best costs of implementing quality 
effort and the last term states the impact of information for the processor. The expected 
 
55 
 
payment given by the processor is thus higher than the first-best costs. We find that the 
processor’s payment increases with the grower’s degree of risk aversion r . A higher risk 
premium must be paid to the risk-averse farmer to induce his participation. Moreover, the 
expected payment is non-decreasing in α . The smaller is the difference in the probability of 
being high quality and low quality, the less sensitive is the quality level to effort levels. Thus 
the observable output is a poor indicator of the grower’s effort on improving quality, and 
higher payments are needed to improve the processor’s ability to differentiate high effort 
from low effort. With low quality effort, the processor instead obtains revenue equal to
( )1h lB pS p Sα α= + − . Thus, B∆  is the gain of increasing quality effort from low to high, 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 1h l h lB pS p S pS p S p Sα α α∆ = + − − + − = − ∆                     (3.9)                       
 where h lS S S∆ = − . The gain comes from the fact that high return hS  arises more often 
when high quality effort is exerted. Had the processor decided to let the grower exert low 
quality effort, he would make a zero payment to the grower whatever the realization of 
output. Thus the cost of inducing a high quality effort is equal to C , i.e., C C∆ = .The 
processor chooses to induce high quality effort when the benefit B∆  is higher than the cost 
C∆ , i.e. 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
2
1 1
1 1 2 2 1
q q q
C r r pS M
p p p
ϕ ϕ ϕα α α
⎡ ⎤∆ −∆ ≥ = = + +⎢ ⎥− − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                 (3.10)                       
where M  is  unit incremental cost of implementing high quality effort.  
 
3.3.2 Safety effort is observable: high safety effort is implemented 
The benchmark model above is extended here to include safety effort. The implicit  
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assumption of this contract is that it is worthwhile for the processor to induce safety effort 
because its benefit is sufficiently larger than its cost. Thus, the optimal contract provided by 
the processor should account for this potential effect and adjust the payment schedule 
accordingly.  
Let us first consider the case where the grower’s effort is fully observable. It is 
assumed that food safety problem will not happen if high safety effort is implemented during 
the production process. Therefore the processor can simply instruct the grower to implement 
safety effort so that the grower’s participation constraint is satisfied with equality. Thus, the 
optimal choice of safety level for the grower is high. Here, when the grower chooses both 
high quality and high safety efforts, the probability that high quality is realized at the delivery 
point is denoted as pδ . The probability of output quality depends not only on the level of 
effort for quality, but also on the level of effort for safety implemented by the same grower. 
Safety influencing parameter δ  denotes the likelihood of obtaining high quality output given 
high safety effort relative to that given low safety effort.  Quality effort and safety effort are 
independent when 1δ = . When 1δ < , safety effort substitutes for the quality effort by 
decreasing the marginal productivity of high quality effort.  When 1δ >  , the efforts are 
complementary, and higher safety improves the probability that a high quality output 
realizes. It is assumed that 1pδ ≤  to guarantee that the probability of realizing a high 
quality is equal to or less than 1.  
The processor adopts an incentive scheme to encourage high quality effort, consisting 
of the payment of  hU  when high quality is realized and a payment lU  when the low quality 
is realized. Given the processor’s strategy, the expected utility for the grower is
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( )1h lpU p Uδ δ+ − , where ( )1 pδ−  is the probability that low quality is realized at the 
delivery point when the grower actually exerts high efforts on both quality and safety. 
It is reasonable to assume that it becomes increasingly difficult for the grower to adopt 
both quality and safety effort. For the grower to enter into a contract with the processor, the 
grower faces safety-improving costs which include, for example, investments in harvesting 
and storage equipment, energy and waste management or investments to improve farm 
worker conditions (e.g., access to latrines). We denote by ϕ   as the cost when he exerts the 
two high efforts levels simultaneously, and by sϕ when only high effort on safety occurs. Of 
course, we have 0sϕ ϕ> > . Moreover, it is easy to understand, when safety effort and 
quality effort are independent, q sϕ ϕ ϕ= + . When safety effort complements quality effort,
q sϕ ϕ ϕ< + , which means it is easier to exert quality effort at the margin when safety effort is 
already performed. When safety effort substitutes for quality effort, q sϕ ϕ ϕ> + , which 
means it is more difficult to exert the quality effort at the margin when the safety effort is 
already performed.  
We denote ( )1h lB pS p Sδ δ= + −  as the expected revenue of the processor, and denote 
( ) ( ) ( )1h lC ph U p h Uδ δ= + −  as the expected payment made to the grower. pδα  is the 
probability of high quality that is realized at the delivery point associated with low quality 
effort and high safety effort at the production process, and ( )1 pδα−  is the probability of 
low quality realized at the delivery point. The parameters satisfy 1p pδα δα< − .  
Similar to the benchmark model, the processor faces the following mechanism design 
problem: 
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,
min
h lU U
C    
 Subject to                                
                                                     ( )1 0h lpU p Uδ δ ϕ+ − − ≥                                             (3.11)                  
( ) ( )1 1h l h l spU p U pU p Uδ δ ϕ δα δα ϕ+ − − ≥ + − −                    (3.12)                       
From the above equations, we can obtain the grower’s optimal utilities: 
    
( ) ( )*
1
1h s
pU
p
δϕ ϕ ϕ δ α
−= + − −                                         (3.13)                       
( ) ( )*
1
1l s
U ϕ ϕ ϕ α= − − −                                           
 (3.14)                       
Therefore, the expected payment to a grower is: 
( ) ( )
22
2
1
2 2 1
q
r r pC
p
δϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ δ α
−= + + − −                              (3.15)                       
Because ( ) ( )2 22/ / 2 1 0qC r pδ ϕ ϕ δ α⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ = − − − <⎣ ⎦ , the expected payment to the 
grower is decreasing with the safety influencing parameter δ .  The processor will pay less 
when safety effort has a positive effect on the realization of high quality (high δ ). When 
food safety is observable and implemented, the incremental expected benefit from 
implementing high quality effort can be expressed as B∆ ,  
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 1h l h lB pS p S pS p S p Sδ δ δα δα α δ∆ = + − − + − = − ∆           (3.16)                       
The increase in cost of implementing high quality effort is the payment to the growers 
implementing two high efforts minus the first-best cost of implementing safety effort only. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22 2
2
1
2 2 1
s s s s
r r pC C h
p
δϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ δ α
−∆ = − = − + − + − −              (3.17)                       
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Similar to the discussion in previous section, the contact is costless to the processor 
when the farmer is risk-neutral, i.e. sC ϕ ϕ∆ = − .The processor prefers to induce effort on 
both tasks rather than on only safety effort when incremental benefit exceeds the incremental 
cost, or B C∆ ≥ ∆ . That is, when:  
( )1
CS M
pα δ
∆∆ ≥ = −                                                
 (3.18)                       
We denote independent efforts by ind, complementary efforts by com and substitute efforts 
by sub.  The results of the preceding analysis lead to the following characterization of an 
optimal contract: 
 
Proposition 1. Given that high safety effort is implemented, the processor’s willingness to 
induce high quality effort is increasing with the safety influencing parameter δ  when 0r ≥ , 
i.e., com ind subM M M< <  .     
Proof: (See Appendix B.2) 
 
This proposition shows that when the local incentive is binding, it is the easiest to 
incentivize high quality effort when a high safety effort is exerted under complementary 
conditions, and it is the most difficult to incentivize high quality effort when the efforts are 
substitutes. The intuition behind proposition 1 is that under complementary conditions, the 
payment inducing high quality effort produces a spillover effect which also encourages the 
grower to exert high effort on safety.  Therefore, the unit incremental cost of inducing quality 
effort under complementary conditions increases less quickly than the cost under unrelated or 
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substitute conditions as one goes from one effort to two efforts. We should note that this 
finding continues to hold for both risk-neutral and risk-averse growers. 
  
Proposition 2. When safety effort is fully observable, if the processor finds it is valuable to 
induce high quality effort, he has 
1) no incentive to induce high safety effort voluntarily under a substitute condition when 
0r ≥ ; 
2) no incentive to induce high safety effort voluntarily under an independent condition 
when 0r > , and is indifferent to inducing high safety effort or not when 0r = ; 
3) incentive to induce high safety effort voluntarily under a complementary condition 
when 0r = ; when 0r > , whether he has incentive to adopt high safety effort or not 
depends on the degree of complementarity of the two efforts. 
Proof: (See Appendix B.3) 
 
According to the proof in the Appendix, if the two efforts are substitutes, the critical 
value for the processor to induce high quality effort given high safety effort is higher than 
that given low safety effort. This is not surprising because implementing safety effort has a 
negative effect on improving quality of the product.  Therefore, the processor would need to 
pay more to induce high quality effort. 
We find that even if the two efforts are independent, the critical value for the processor 
to induce high quality effort given high safety effort is higher than that given low safety 
effort with risk-averse growers. Since efforts on improving quality and safety are technically 
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unrelated, providing incentives on one effort will not affect the cost of incentives on the other 
effort. However, to implement high safety effort, the processor needs to incur an additional 
cost ( )1
s qr
p
ϕ ϕ
α−  
due to the risk sharing. The cost can be treated as efficiency loss because of 
the grower’s risk aversion. Everything else being held equal, it becomes harder for the 
processor to induce high quality effort as the grower’s degree of risk aversion r increases. If 
the grower is risk neutral ( 0r = ), the processor need not pay any additional cost to induce 
the grower to implement safety effort. 
If the two efforts are complements, the processor is more likely to incur quality effort 
with high safety effort when the grower is risk neutral ( 0r = ). It is easier for the grower to 
accomplish quality effort at the margin when safety effort is implemented simultaneously. 
With a risk-averse grower, the processor needs to pay a risk premium to induce high safety 
effort. Thus, whether or not the processor is likely to induce high quality effort with high 
safety effort is determined by the impacts of parameter r  andδ . If the effect of risk parameter 
r  on the critical value is dominant, the processor is willing to induce low safety effort. If the 
effect of safety influencing parameter δ  on the critical value is dominant, the processor 
prefers high safety effort.  
 
3.3.3 Asymmetric information model with a traceability system 
Let us turn to the case of incomplete information on both quality effort and safety 
effort.  As in the previous case, the grower performs two activities with respect to quality 
effort and safety effort with the same production process. The two activities affect the 
stochastic production process simultaneously.  Different from the previous case, the efforts 
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provided by the grower in both quality and safety cannot be directly observed by the 
processor, although the measured quality level and whether there is a food safety problem or 
not is verifiable. Deviation attributed to a simultaneous shirking along both quality effort and 
safety effort dimensions may occur.  Recall Proposition 2, when food safety is non-
contractible, the processor implements high safety effort voluntarily if and only if quality and 
safety efforts are highly complementary.  In order to decrease economic losses caused by 
food safety problems, a traceability system is introduced to the food-supply chain to 
encourage high safety effort in the production process. Traceability provides product 
information on the product’s origins and can locate the source of the food safety problem. 
Thus, the processor requires the provision of effort in both quality and safety. In this section 
we analyze how incentive considerations affect the optimal mix of efforts along each 
dimension of the agent’s performance and how traceability influences the incentives of 
growers to deliver safe products.  
Figure 3.1 describes the possible events that could happen in the supply chain and their 
probabilities with varying quality and safety effort. A more detailed description of the 
notation can be found in table 3.7 in the Appendix. Define ( ),q se e  as the input pairs in 
quality effort and safety effort; ( ),q sy y  are the realized output pairs in quality and safety. 
We assume that the production externality is asymmetric, which means that the effort level 
on quality does not influence the probability of safety level. This assumption ensures that 
high quality effort has no impact on the probability that a safe product is realized.  If the 
grower exerts high safety effort, we denote the probability that his product is safe as t , and 
the probability that his product is unsafe 1 t− . tβ  and 1 tβ−  are defined as the probability 
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that safe product and unsafe product, respectively, are generated by low safety effort, where 
0 1β< < . Parameter β  reflects the likelihood that a safe product results given low safety 
effort relative to that given from high safety effort. 
 
Figure 3.1. Possible efforts and outcomes in the supply chain 
 
If the unsafe lot can be traced back to the responsible grower, the grower will be 
assessed a penalty.  If the unsafe lot cannot be traced to the responsible grower, the grower 
need not pay any extra costs because of the unsafe food. We denote s  as the traceability rate 
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which is the probability that the origin of the unsafe product can be traced to the grower. 
Then the probability of the product being valued as high safety is the sum of the probability 
that the product is actually safe, and the probability that an unsafe lot cannot be traced back 
to the responsible grower. Therefore, the probability of the product being valued as high 
safety is ( )( )( )1 1t s t+ − −  if high safety effort is implemented, and is ( )( )( )1 1t s tβ β+ − −  
if low safety effort is implemented. This probability depends highly on the traceability rate. 
Since 1s ≤ , even if a traceability system were in place, its performance is generally not one 
hundred percent reliable. Thus, the level of safety effort is only partly observable in the 
grower’s results.        
Recall the timeline of the principal-agent game, the contingent income is transferred to 
the grower based on the measured quality of the product at the delivery point, and then the 
transaction ends. When a traceability system is in place, it is possible for the processor to 
associate the unsafe product to the responsible grower with a certain probability success. 
When the product is detected as unsafe in the subsequent supply stages, the responsible 
grower is punished even after the transaction has occurred.  
Here, we define ( ), ,ij i j h lU =  as the final utility that the grower can obtain from the 
payment only if realized quality is i  and realized safety is j . For example, if the grower 
implements both high quality effort and high safety effort simultaneously during his 
production process, the probability of being paid as high quality is pδ  and the probability of 
being paid as high safety is ( )( )( )1 1t s t+ − − . Therefore, hhU  is obtained with probability
( )( )( )1 1p t s tδ + − − . The probability distribution of output conditional on effort levels are  
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presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. Probability distribution of output conditional on effort level 
Probability y hh=  y lh= y hl=  y ll=  
( )|P y hh  ( )( )( )1 1p t s tδ + − −  ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1p t s tδ− + − −  ( )1ps tδ −  ( ) ( )1 1p s tδ− −
( )|P y lh  ( )( )( )1 1p t s tδα + − −  ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1p t s tδα− + − −  ( )1ps tδα −  ( ) ( )1 1p s tδα− −
( )|P y hl  ( ) ( )( )1 1p t s tβ β+ − −  ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1p t s tβ β− + − −  ( )1ps tβ−  ( ) ( )1 1p s tβ− −
( )|P y ll  ( )( )( )1 1p t s tα β β+ − −  ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1p t s tα β β− + − −  ( )1ps tα β− ( ) ( )1 1p s tα β− −
 
When the processor cannot observe the grower’s choices of quality effort and safety 
effort, he has to devise an output contingent contract. His problem is therefore to offer 
payments so that the grower puts in the two high efforts that maximize the processor’s 
expected return. The grower can choose to exert high effort on both quality and safety, on 
only quality or only safety, or on no tasks at all. Similar to the previous case, an incentive 
feasible contract must induce the choice of a high investment on quality if the processor finds 
it is valuable.   
( ) ( )
, , , ,
| |ij ij s
i j h l i j h l
P U P Uij hh ij lhϕ ϕ
= =
− ≥ −∑ ∑
 
                               (3.19)                       
Compared to the case with observable safety effort, two new incentive constraints must be 
added to describe the set of incentive feasible contracts. First, consider the incentive 
constraint to induce high safety effort: 
   
( ) ( )
, , , ,
| |ij ij q
i j h l i j h l
P U P Uij hh ij hlϕ ϕ
= =
− ≥ −∑ ∑
                           
 (3.20)                       
Second, the global constraint prevents the grower from simultaneously reducing both quality 
and safety efforts.  
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( ) ( )
, , , ,
| |ij ij
i j h l i j h l
P U P Uij hh ij llϕ
= =
− ≥∑ ∑
                                
 (3.21)                       
Finally, the grower will choose the level of efforts which gives him the largest payoff as long 
as this maximized value is no less than the reservation cost. 
( )
, ,
0| ij
i j h l
P Uij hh ϕ
=
− ≥∑                                                  
 
 (3.22)                         
The optimal incentive feasible contract is thus a solution to the following problem: 
     
( ) ( )
   , ,
min min |
ij
ijU i j h l
C P h Uij hh
=
= ∑
                                          
 (3.23)                       
                                               Subject to (3.19) ~ (3.22) 
We should stress that there are important interaction effects between the grower’s 
incentive for implementing one effort and the incentive for implementing the other effort.  
Thus, the two local constraints of the grower need not necessarily bind at the same time.  
The optimal contract parameters can be written as follows: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )1 2 3
| | |
1 1 1
| | |ij
p ij lh p ij hl p ij ll
U
p ij hh p ij hh p ij hh
λ λ λ ϕ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − + − + − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  
          (3.24)                       
(See Appendix B.4) 
The payment to the grower consists of a fixed component and three incentive components. 
The fixed component ϕ which is the cost of implementing two high efforts ensures that the 
grower accepts the contract. The first incentive component induces high effort on quality, the 
second incentive component induces high effort on safety, and the third one induces both. 
 
Proposition 3. When s
q
A
B
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
− >−  
and s A
D
ϕ ϕ
ϕ
− >
 
are satisfied, the traceability system has 
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 no effect on the final payments of unsafe products, i.e., 0 and 0hh hl lh llU U U U− = − = ; 
otherwise, the processor pays more for safe products than for unsafe products, i.e., 
0hh hlU U− >  and 0lh llU U− > , where ,  and A B D  are defined in the Appendix. 
Proof: (See Appendix B.5) 
 
From the proof in the Appendix B.5, we know 2 3 0λ λ= =  when s
q
A
B
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
− >−  
and
s A
D
ϕ ϕ
ϕ
− >
 
are satisfied. This implies that equation (3.20) and (3.21) are always slack 
(satisfied) for all possible values of the traceability rate. In other word, for the grower, the 
benefit of implementing high safety effort is always higher than that of implementing low 
safety effort.  According to the above analysis, this situation may only happen under the 
condition that quality and safety efforts are highly complementary. In this case, 
implementing high safety effort has a positive effect on improving the quality of the product, 
and the grower always chooses high safety effort regardless of the traceability rate. This 
proposition is very useful for providing guidance on the design of a traceability system. This 
result is corresponds to the finding of Starbird et al. (2008) which shows that it is possible 
that the traceability system has no influence on the expected utility of the agent. Except for 
this case, the payment of a high safety product is higher than that of a low safety product. 
The difference in the payment can be looked at as the disutility of penalty on delivering 
unsafe product. However, due to the complex settings, it is hard to characterize the optimal 
contract in an explicit form. More interesting experimental results will be showed in next 
section.   
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3.4 Simulation analysis  
We now construct a simulation model to illustrate our comparative statics results for 
the fresh lettuce market. The main objective is to examine how an efficient contract is 
affected by alternative plausible values for parameters. To start, we list the values of 
parameters in table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Parameters used in the numerical example 
Parameter Value 
Complements Independence Substitutes 
p  0.85 0.85 0.85 
1 p−  0.15 0.15 0.15 
pα  0.05 0.05 0.05 
1 pα−  0.95 0.95 0.95 
pδ  0.95 0.85 0.75 
1 pδ−  0.05 0.15 0.25 
pδα  0.06 0.05 0.04 
1 pδα−  0.94 0.95 0.96 
δ  1.12 1.00 0.88 α  0.06 0.06 0.06 
β  0.40 0.40 0.40 
t  0.80 0.80 0.80 
qϕ  0.18 0.18 0.18 
sϕ  0.015 0.015 0.015 ϕ  0.19 0.195 0.20 
 
The average grower’s price for fresh lettuce in the year 2006 was equal to $ 0.18 per 
pound (USDA/ERS 2007). We assume that the cost of the main good agricultural practices 
which improve product safety is about 1.5 cent per pound. When the two efforts are 
independent, the cost of implementing two efforts simultaneously is the summation of the 
two effort costs, $0.195; when the efforts are complements, the cost of implementing two 
efforts is assumed to be less than the summation and is equal to $0.19; when the two efforts 
are substitutes, the cost of implementing two efforts is assumed to be higher than the 
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summation and is equal to $0.20. Here we assume the likelihood of obtaining high quality 
( 0.06)α = is far lower than the likelihood of obtaining high safety effort ( 0.40)β = . This is 
because the performance on quality effort is measured more precisely than on safety effort. 
Table 3.3 summarizes the results of our numerical examples where exogenous 
variables are varied for different scenarios. The first column gives the names of contract 
parameters. Expected payment to the grower is denoted byC . M is per unit incremental cost, 
in other word, the critical point that the processor incurs high quality effort. The second 
column provides the values of optimal contract parameters under the case when low safety 
effort is implemented. The next three columns give the solutions under the case when high 
safety effort is implemented and when the safety effort is fully observable. 
Table 3.3. Simulation results on contract design 
Variable 
Value 
With low 
safety effort 
With high safety effort 
(Safety effort if observable 0 and 1tβ = = ) 
  Complements Independence Substitutes 
hU  0.214 0.199 0.229 0.266 
lU  -0.011 0.004 0.004 0.003 
( )hh U  0.225 0.209 0.242 0.284 
( )lh U  -0.011 0.004 0.004 0.003 
C  0.190 0.199 0.206 0.213 
M  0.237 0.223 0.258 0.303 
 
The results in Table 3.3 show first that with high safety effort, the critical point of 
inducing high quality effort, M , is lowest (0.223) when efforts on improving quality and 
safety are complements. The critical point is the highest (0.303) when the two efforts are 
substitutes.  Efficiency here requires that the processor pays more to give incentives to the 
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grower to implement high quality effort because implementing high safety effort causes a 
negative effect on quality improvement. 
With low safety effort, the critical point of inducing high quality effort is 0.237. While 
with high safety effort, the critical point is 0.258 with independent efforts and is 0.303 with 
substitute efforts. This implies when the two efforts are independent or substitutes, if the 
processor is willing to induce high quality effort, he prefers to implement low safety effort 
instead of high safety effort simultaneously. Under complementary conditions, the critical 
point is 0.223 with high safety effort which is lower than that with low safety effort (0.237). 
This demonstrates that complementarity between the two efforts can create an externality that 
can decrease incentive cost. Therefore, it makes the processor prefer taking high safety effort 
and high quality effort simultaneously. 
Now we turn to the question of how the effect of traceability influences optimal 
contracts and what is the efficient design of the grower contract. From the simulation results, 
the global incentive constraint (3.21) is more stringent than the local incentive constraint on 
safety effort (3.20) under complementarity condition. This indicates that it becomes more 
difficult for the processor to induce the grower to exert high effort on both tasks 
simultaneously rather than on safety effort alone when both of the efforts are unobservable. 
When the efforts are substitutes, the local incentive constraint on safety effort (3.20) is more 
stringent than the global incentive constraint (3.21). This indicates it is more difficult for the 
processor to induce the grower to exert a high effort on safety alone rather than on both tasks 
simultaneously. Figure 3.2-3.5 and Tables 3.4-3.6 provide the simulation results.  
Figure 3.2 illustrates the impacts of traceability on expected payment to the grower. 
We find that the expected payment always decreases with the increase of the traceability rate 
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despite the relationship between the two efforts. This is because the traceability system has 
the effect of punishing growers held responsible for delivering unsafe products and hence of 
inducing more safety efforts.  
Figure 3.2 also shows that the processor needs to pay more when the efforts are 
substitutes to induce both efforts than with either complementary or independent conditions. 
The intuition behind this is if the two efforts are substitutes, then providing incentive for high 
quality effort has a negative effect on the realization of high safety. Given high quality effort, 
the lower the possibility of high safety decreases the sensitivity of realization of the high 
safety product to the change in quality effort.  
  
           Figure 3.2. Expected payment to growers           Figure 3.3. Utility difference between high quality 
                                                                                                       and low quality with unsafe product      
                                                                                     
The simulation results indicate that the change in traceability rate has no influence on 
the payments to high safety products. Figure 3.3 depicts that if the product is detected as 
unsafe, with the increase of traceability rate, the payment difference between high quality 
product and low quality product ( )hl llU U−  decreases when the efforts are complementary, 
increases when they are substitutes, and does not change when they are independent. When 
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the two efforts are complements, the effort to improve food quality has a chance of 
improving food safety. A larger payment difference between high quality and low quality 
product is needed to encourage high safety effort when s  is very small. The existence of a 
traceability system also has a positive effect on inducing high safety effort, and hence the 
payment difference is reduced when the traceability rate goes up. When the two efforts are 
substitutes, the effort on improving food quality makes the realization of safe product 
become more difficult. The grower has less incentive to implement high quality effort with 
higher levels of s . Thus the processor needs to increase the payment difference to encourage 
high quality effort. The fact that the payment difference under independent conditions is not 
influenced by the traceability rate is because there is no interaction effect between the two 
efforts.  
It should be noted that when the traceability rate is very low ( )0.1s = , the payment 
difference when the efforts are substitutes, -0.2273hl llU U− = , is less than zero (see Table 
3.6).  In this case, the processor chooses to induce low safety effort instead of high safety 
effort. At this time the traceability is too low to differentiate safe and unsafe product. The 
processor has no incentive to pay extra costs to the grower to induce high safety. 
Table 3.4. Simulation results under independent conditions 
s Uhh Ulh Uhl Ull Uhl-U11 Uhh-Uhl Ulh-Ull C 
0.1 0.2350 0.0098 -0.0775 -0.3027 0.2253 0.3125 0.3125 0.20660 
0.2 0.2350 0.0098 0.0788 -0.1465 0.2253 0.1562 0.1563 0.20636 
0.3 0.2350 0.0098 0.1309 -0.0944 0.2253 0.1042 0.1042 0.20628 
0.4 0.2350 0.0098 0.1569 -0.0684 0.2253 0.0781 0.0781 0.20624 
0.5 0.2350 0.0098 0.1725 -0.0527 0.2253 0.0625 0.0625 0.20621 
0.6 0.2350 0.0098 0.1830 -0.0423 0.2253 0.0521 0.0521 0.20620 
0.7 0.2350 0.0098 0.1904 -0.0349 0.2253 0.0446 0.0446 0.20619 
0.8 0.2350 0.0098 0.1960 -0.0293 0.2253 0.0391 0.0391 0.20618 
0.9 0.2350 0.0098 0.2003 -0.0250 0.2253 0.0347 0.0347 0.20617 
1 0.2350 0.0098 0.2038 -0.0215 0.2253 0.0312 0.0313 0.20616 
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Table 3.5. Simulation results under complementary conditions 
s Uhh Ulh Uhl Ull Uhl-U11 Uhh-Uhl Ulh-Ull C 
0.1 0.1994 0.0099 0.19858 -0.2931 0.4917 0.00082 0.3030 0.1994835 
0.2 0.1994 0.0099 0.19899 -0.1416 0.3406 0.00041 0.1515 0.1994725 
0.3 0.1994 0.0099 0.19913 -0.0911 0.2902 0.00027 0.1010 0.1994688 
0.4 0.1994 0.0099 0.19920 -0.0659 0.2651 0.00021 0.0757 0.1994669 
0.5 0.1994 0.0099 0.19924 -0.0507 0.2499 0.00016 0.0606 0.1994658 
0.6 0.1994 0.0099 0.19927 -0.0406 0.2399 0.00014 0.0505 0.1994651 
0.7 0.1994 0.0099 0.19929 -0.0334 0.2327 0.00012 0.0433 0.1994646 
0.8 0.1994 0.0099 0.19930 -0.0280 0.2273 0.00010 0.0379 0.1994642 
0.9 0.1994 0.0099 0.19931 -0.0238 0.2231 0.00009 0.0337 0.1994639 
1 0.1994 0.0099 0.19932 -0.0204 0.2197 0.00008 0.0303 0.1994636 
 
Table 3.6. Simulation results under conditions of substitution 
s Uhh Ulh Uhl Ull Uhl-U11 Uhh-Uhl Ulh-Ull C 
0.1 0.2873 0.0142 -0.7635 -0.5362 -0.2273 1.0508 0.5504 0.21768 
0.2 0.2873 0.0142 -0.2381 -0.2610 0.0229 0.5254 0.2752 0.21543 
0.3 0.2873 0.0142 -0.0630 -0.1693 0.1063 0.3503 0.1835 0.21468 
0.4 0.2873 0.0142 0.0246 -0.1234 0.1480 0.2627 0.1376 0.21430 
0.5 0.2873 0.0142 0.0772 -0.0959 0.1730 0.2102 0.1101 0.21407 
0.6 0.2873 0.0142 0.1122 -0.0775 0.1897 0.1751 0.0917 0.21392 
0.7 0.2873 0.0142 0.1372 -0.0644 0.2016 0.1501 0.0786 0.21382 
0.8 0.2873 0.0142 0.1560 -0.0546 0.2106 0.1314 0.0688 0.21373 
0.9 0.2873 0.0142 0.1706 -0.0470 0.2175 0.1168 0.0612 0.21367 
1 0.2873 0.0142 0.1822 -0.0408 0.2231 0.1051 0.0550 0.21362 
 
Figure 3.4 and 3.5 show that the penalty on unsafe product is always decreasing with 
the increase of traceability rate in both high quality hh hlU U−  and low quality lh llU U−  cases.  
 
 
Figure 3.4. Penalty on low safety                                Figure 3.5. Penalty on low safety 
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It is not surprising because traceability has a positive effect on inducing high safety effort. 
Furthermore, the penalty is always highest when the two efforts are substitutes. This is 
because of the fact that the grower is not willing to exert high safety effort due to its negative 
effect on the realization of high quality, and the penalty should be high enough to induce 
high safety effort when s is very small. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
The rise of food-safety related problems has received attention recently. In this paper, 
we present a discussion on the implications of the interaction between safety effort and 
quality effort on the behavior of the grower as well as contract design. The incentive 
structure with a tractability system is developed employing a multitask principal-agent 
model. The predictions of the theoretical model are given by simulation experiments. The 
primary contribution of this research is that we incorporate traceability into the analysis of 
contract design and investigate contractual relations for both food quality and food safety.  
The model and simulation results show that 1) when high safety effort occurs, the 
processor induces high quality effort with lowest cost when quality and safety efforts are 
complements, and with highest cost when the two efforts are substitutes; 2) with complete 
information on safety effort, if the processor finds inducing high quality effort is valuable, he 
or she has no incentive to encourage high safety effort simultaneously when the two efforts 
are independent or substitutes; 3) If safety effort is unobservable and traceability is in place, 
the final payment to unsafe product is not higher than that to safe product; 4) The expected 
payments to the grower always decrease with an increase in the traceability rate. The 
expected payment is lowest when the efforts are complementary, and highest when they are 
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substitutes; 5) The change in traceability rate does not influence payments for safe  products; 
6) If the product is detected as unsafe, with the increase of traceability, the payment 
difference between high quality product and low quality product decreases when the efforts 
are complementary, increases when they are substitutes, and does not change when they are 
independent; and finally, 7) The penalty on unsafe product decreases with the increase of 
traceability rate, and it is always highest when the two efforts are substitutes. 
The findings of this research are interesting, but the validity of results is limited by the 
set of assumptions. Further research is suggested to assess the robustness of the results. Since 
real-world contracts between a processor and a grower may contain a provision on quantity 
of product, quantity is yet to be incorporated in the model and a complete menu of contract 
payments need to be evaluated. A traceability system will incur a variety of costs which may 
include investments in identifying devices, data recording and administrative fees. The cost 
could be passed to growers, recovered from added value to the final product, and/or be 
shared among all participants in the supply chain.  With slight modification to the model, we 
can incorporate traceability costs into the model and analyze its effects on optimal contract 
design. Moreover, since the realization of quality level maybe more than two possible levels, 
or is characterized as a continuous variable, measurement of quality should to be examined if 
these settings have any effect on the incentive provisions. 
  
 
76 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Alerlof,G. 1970. “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 84: 488-500. 
Caswell, J. and M.Mojduszka. 1996. “Using Informational Labeling to Influence the Market 
for Quality in Food Products.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78: 
1248-1253. 
Crespi J.M. and S.Marette. 2003. “Some Economic Implications of Public Labeling.” 
Journal of Food Distribution Research 34 (3): 83-94. 
Hueth, B, E. Ligon, S. Wolf and S. Wu. 1999. “Incentive Instruments in Fruit and                
Vegetable  Contracts: Input Control, Monitoring, Measuring, and Price Risk.” Review 
of Agricultural Economics 21 (2): 374-389. 
Grossmann, S. and O. Hart. 1983. “An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem.” 
Econometrica 51: 7-45. 
FAO/WHO. 1997. Codex Alimentarius Food Hygiene Basic Texts. Joint FAO/WHO Food 
Standards Programme, Codex Alimentarius Commission. Publication number: M-83. 
Fraser, R. 2002. “Moral Hazard and Risk Management in Agri-environmental Policy.” 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 53 (3): 475-487. 
Fraser, R. 2004. “On the Use of Targeting to Reduce Moral Hazard in Agri-environmental 
Schemes.” Journal of Agricultural Economics 55 (3): 525-540. 
Filho, M.R. 2007. “A Principal-Agent Model for Investigating Traceability Systems 
Incentives on Food Safety.” Contributed Paper prepared for presentation at the 105th 
EAAE Seminar ‘International Marketing and International Trade of Quality Food 
Products’, Bologna, Italy, March 8-10. 
Ginder R., B. Hueth and P. Marcoul. 2005. “Cooperatives and Contracting in Agriculture: 
The Case of West Liberty Foods.” Working Paper WP#1, Iowa State University. 
 
77 
 
Goodhue, R. E. 2000. “Broiler Production Contract as a Multi-Agent Problem: Common 
Risk, Incentives and Heterogeneity.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82 
(August) 606-622. 
Hennessy, D.A., J. Roosen and H.H. Jensen. 2003. “Systemic Failure in the Provision of Safe 
Food.” Food Policy 28: 77-96. 
Hirschauer N. and O. Musshoff. 2007. “A Game-theoretic Approach to Behavioral Food 
Risks: The Case of Grain Markets.” Food Policy 32: 246-265. 
Hueth B. and E. Ligon. 2002. “Estimation of an Efficient Tomato Contract.” European 
Review of Agricultural Economics 29 (2): 237-253. 
Hueth B. and T. Melkonyan. 2004. “Identity Preservation, Multitasking and Agricultural 
Contract Design.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 86 (3): 842-847. 
ISO 9000 Standards for quality. 
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_standards.htm. 
Laffont, J. and D. Martimort. 2001. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. 
Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
Ligon, E. 2004. “Using production data to design efficient contracts.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 86 (3): 848-853. 
MacDonald J, J Perry, M. Ahearn, D. Banker, W. Chambers, C. Mimitri, N. Key, K. Nelson 
and L. Southard. 2004. “Contracts, Markets, and Prices: Organizing the Production 
and Use of Agricultural Commodities.” USDA ERS Report No. 837. 
McEvoy, D.M. and D.M.S- Monteiro. 2008 “Can an Industry Voluntary Agreement on Food 
Traceability Minimize the Cost of Food Safety Incidents?” Paper prepared for the 
Organized Session on the “Economics of Traceability” at the XIIth Congress of the 
European Association of Agricultural Economics Association, Gent, Belgium, July 
26-29. 
 
78 
 
Olesen, H. B. 2003. “Contract production of peas.” Food Policy 18: 83-94. 
Resende-Filho, M.A. and B.L. Buhr. 2008.  “A Principal-Agent Model for Evaluating the 
Economic Value of a Traceability System: A Case Study with Injection-site Lesion 
Control in Fed Cattle.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 90: 1091-1102. 
Souza Monteiro, M. Diogo and Julie A. Caswell. 2010. Economics of Traceability in Multi-
Ingredient Food Chains. Agribusiness 26 (1): 122-142. 
Starbird, S.A. 2005. “Moral Hazard, Inspection Policy, and Food Safety.” American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 87: 15-27. 
Starbird, S. A. 2005. “Supply Chain Contracts and Food Safety.” Choices 20 (2): 123-128. 
Starbird, S. A. 2008. “Traceability, Moral Hazard, and Food Safety .” 12th Congress of the 
European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE. 
USDA Economic Research Service. 1960-2007. Lettuce Statistics. 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1576 
Wang Y. and E.C. Jaenicke. 2006. “Simulating the Impacts of Contract Supplies in a Spot 
Market-Contract Market Equilibrium Setting.” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 88 (4): 1062-1077. 
Weaver R. D. and T. Kim. 2000. “Contracting to Manage Risk in Food Supply Chains.”Paper 
presented at IAMA 2000 Meetings, Chicago, Illinois.  
 
79 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
B.1. Deducing ( ) ( ){ }* * * *, , ,h l h lU U h U h U -safety effort is observable 
From equation (3.2), we get  
( ) ( )1 0h l qp U Uα ϕ− − − ≥                                                (B1) 
To solve the processor’s problem, we form the Lagrangian 
   
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
   + 1 + 1    
h l
h l q h l q
L ph U p h U
pU p U p U Uµ ϕ λ α ϕ
= + −
+ − − − − −         (B2) 
The first-order conditions with respect to hU  and lU  are 
( ) ( )1 1 hp p p rUµ λ α+ − = +                                            (B3) 
   ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1 lp p p rUµ λ α− − − = − +                                  (B4) 
From (B3) and (B4) we then have that the multiplier for the participation constraint µ equals 
to the expected payment to the grower, i.e.  
( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 1 1h lp rU p rU rE Uµ = + + − + = +                             (B5) 
 From the participation constraint we can get ( ) qE U ϕ= , and the optimal contract parameters 
can be derived as follows: 
 
( )1h qU r
λϕ α= + −
                                                         
(B6) 
11
1l q
pU
r p
λ αϕ ⎛ ⎞−= + −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠                                                 
(B7) 
Combing (B1), (B6) and (B7) yields the multiplier for the incentive compatibility constraint: 
( )2
1
1
q
pr
p
λ ϕ α
−= −                                                          
(B8) 
 
80 
 
Plug λ  into (B6) and (B7), we get 
 ( )
* 1
1h q q
pU
p
ϕ ϕ α
−= + −                                                  
(B9) 
* 1
1l q q
U ϕ ϕ α= − −                                                    (B10) 
 
B.2. Proof of Proposition 1 
Equations (3.16) and (3.18) yield the following results: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22 2
2
1
2 2 1
s s s s
r r pC C h
p
δϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ δ α
−∆ = − = − + − + − −            
(B11) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 3
22 2
2
2 2
2
32 2
1 1
1 1 2 2 1
1                         
1 2 1 2 1
s s s
s s
s
M M M
C r r pM
p p p
r r p
p p p
δϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕα δ α δ δ α
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ δϕ ϕα δ α δ δ α
⎡ ⎤∆ −= = − + − + −⎢ ⎥− − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
− − −= + + −− − −14243 14243 14444244443
    
(B12) 
Since com ind subq sϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ< = + < and 1com ind subδ δ δ> = > , we get  
1 1 1
com ind subM M M< <  
and                                                       2 2 2
com ind subM M M< <  
Since ( )( )( )
2
3 32 3
2
/
2 1
sprM
p
δ ϕ ϕδ α δ
− −∂ ∂ = −  
and 2 0pδ − < , we get 3 / 0M δ∂ ∂ < .  
Thus, 3 3 3
com ind subM M M< <  is satisfied.  
Finally, we obtain  
                                                          com ind subM M M< <  
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B.3. Proof of Proposition 2 
 Without adopting high safety effort, the critical point for the processor to induce high quality 
effort is 
( ) ( )
0 2 2
2
1 1
1 2 2 1
q q q
r r pM
p p
ϕ ϕ ϕα α
⎡ ⎤−= + +⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦                                 
(B13) 
With high safety effort, when the two efforts are unrelated, 1δ = , ind s qϕ ϕ ϕ− = , and the unit 
incremental cost is  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22 2
2
1 1
1 2 2 1
ind ind ind ind
s s s
r r pM
p p
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕα α
⎡ ⎤−= − + − + −⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦        
(B14) 
Thus,  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 2 2
2
22 2
2
1 1
1 2 2 1
1 1                   -
1 2 2 1
ind
q q q
ind ind ind
s s s
r r pM M
p p
r r p
p p
ϕ ϕ ϕα α
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕα α
⎡ ⎤−− = + +⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤−− + − + −⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦    
(B15) 
we get 
( )0 01
s qind rM M
p
ϕ ϕ
α− = − ≤− , with 0r ≥                             (B16) 
When the two efforts are substitutes, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 2 2
2
22 2
2
1 1
1 2 2 1
1 1                  -
1 2 2 1
sub
q q q
sub sub sub
s s s
r r pM M
p p
r r p
p p
ϕ ϕ ϕα α
δϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕα δ δ α
⎡ ⎤−− = + +⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤−− + − + −⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
82 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
3
2 2 2
0
22
3 32 2 2
1 1 2 1 1
1 1                +
2 1 1
                
sub sub
q qsub s s
M M
sub
q s
M
rM M
p p p p
r p p
p p
ϕ ϕϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
α α δ α α δ
δϕ ϕ ϕα δ α
∆ ∆
∆
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− −⇒ − = − + −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥− − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− −− −⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
14444244443 14444244443
1444444442444444443
              
 (B17) 
Since subq sϕ ϕ ϕ< −  and 1δ < , it is easy to get 1 0M∆ <  and 2 0M∆ <  when 0r > . 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
22
3 3 32 2 2
2
22
3 32 2 2 2
1 1
2 1 1
1 1 
2 1 1
sub
q s
sub
q s
r p pM
p p
pr p
p p
δϕ ϕ ϕα δ α
δ δϕ ϕ ϕδ α δ α
⎡ ⎤− −∆ = − −⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− −= − −⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦                         
(B18) 
Since ( )2 1 1 1p p pδ δ− < − < − , then 3 0M∆ <  when 0r > . Thus, we get 0 0subM M− < . 
With 0r = , ( ) ( )0 01 1
sub
qsub sM M
p p
ϕ ϕ ϕ
α α δ
−− = − <− − . 
When the two efforts are complements, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
0 2 2
2
22 2
2
2 2 2
1 1
1 2 2 1
1 1                  -
1 2 2 1
                
1 1 2 1 1
com
q q q
com com com
s s s
com com
q qs s
M
r r pM M
p p
r r p
p p
r
p p p p
ϕ ϕ ϕα α
δϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕα δ δ α
ϕ ϕϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
α α δ α α δ
∆
⎡ ⎤−− = + +⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤−− + − + −⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡⎡ ⎤− −= − + −⎢ ⎥− − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦14444244443
( ) ( ) ( )
2
3
22
3 32 2 2
1 1                +
2 1 1
M
com
q s
M
r p p
p p
δϕ ϕ ϕα δ α
∆
∆
⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− −− −⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
14444244443
1444444442444444443
         
 (B19) 
Since comq sϕ ϕ ϕ> −  and 1δ > , it is easy to get 1 0M∆ >  when 0r > . 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
22
3 3 32 2 2
2
22
3 32 2 2 2
1 1
2 1 1
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(B20) 
Since ( )2 1 1 1p p pδ δ− > − > − , then 3 0M∆ >  when 0r > . 
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(B21) 
2M∆  may be higher, lower than or equal to zero, hence whether 0M  is higher, lower than, or 
equal to comM  is undetermined. 
With 0r = , ( ) ( )0 01 1
com
qcom sM M
p p
ϕ ϕ ϕ
α α δ
−− = − >− − . 
 
B.4. Deducing { }*ijU , ,i j h l= -safety effort is unobservable 
From equation (3.19)-(3.22), we form the Lagrangian 
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From the first-order conditions with respect to ijU , we get ( )1 rE Uµ = + . From the 
participation constraint we obtain ( )E U ϕ= , and then the optimal contract parameters can be 
derived as follows: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )1 2 3
| | |
1 1 1
| | |ij
p ij lh p ij hl p ij ll
U
p ij hh p ij hh p ij hh
λ λ λ ϕ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − + − + − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
             (B23) 
 
B.5. Proof of Proposition 3 
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(B24) 
Since ( )( )( )( )
1 1 1
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(B25) 
Because high quality is always induced at minimum cost, 1 0λ > . 
If 2 3 0λ λ= =  is satisfied, then hh hlU U= ; otherwise, hh hlU U> .,  
Similarly, 
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(B26)  
Since  
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(B27) 
If 2 3 0λ λ= =  is satisfied, then lh llU U= ; otherwise, lh llU U> . 
If 2 0λ = , then (3.20) is slack, plug ijU  into (3.21), we get s
q
A
B
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
− >− , 
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If 3 0λ = , then (3.21) is slack, plug ijU  into (3.20), we get s AD
ϕ ϕ
ϕ
− > ; 
where 
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Table 3.7. Notation for the contract model 
( )| ,q q sp P h h l=  Probability of high quality generated by high quality effort and 
low safety effort. 
( )|s st P h h=  Probability of high safety generated by high safety effort. 
( ) ( )| / |q q q qP h l P h hα =  Likelihood of obtaining high quality given low quality effort 
relative to that given high quality effort. 
( ) ( )| / |s s s sP h l P h hβ =  Likelihood of obtaining high safety given low safety effort relative 
to that given high safety effort. 
( ) ( )| , / | ,q q s q q sP h h h P h h lδ =
 
Likelihood of obtaining high quality effort given high quality 
effort and high safety effort to that given high quality effort and 
low safety effort. 
s
 
Traceability that responsible growers are traced. 
qϕ Cost of implementing high quality effort. 
sϕ  Cost of implementing high safety effort. 
ϕ
 Cost of implementing high safety effort and high quality effort 
h hU  Utility of payment to the grower when high quality and high safety are  realized 
lhU  Utility of payment to the grower when low quality and high safety are  realized 
h lU  Utility of payment to the grower when high quality and low safety are  realized 
llU  Utility of payment to the grower when low quality and low safety are  realized 
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CHAPTER 4. POTENTIAL HPAI SHOCKS AND THE WELFARE 
IMPLICATIONS OF MARKET POWER IN THE U.S. BROILER 
INDUSTRY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) has been recognized as a great concern for 
broiler production, wildlife conservation and public health. Between 2003 and August 2009, 
62 countries reported HPAI cases in their domestic poultry or wildlife (Narrod 2009). The 
World Bank estimates that the HPAI disease could cost the world economy between US$800 
billion dollars and US$3 trillion dollars (Narrod 2009). HPAI is highly contagious and causes 
severe illness in poultry with high mortality; it can cause mortality rates of 90% or higher in 
domesticated poultry within 48 hours of infection (CDC). With concern for transmission to 
humans, outbreaks of HPAI have caused major changes in demand, led to an increase in 
costs to producers through additional input use, and caused price volatility which could in 
turn induce dramatic market instability.  The United States exports more poultry product than 
any other country in the world. When export markets are taken into account, even a relatively 
small outbreak has the potential to cause large welfare loss, especially if trade is restricted. 
Although mainly affecting the broiler sector and egg sectors, an HPAI shock is expected to 
influence other related livestock sectors as well. 
To understand the potential welfare effects of HPAI, we consider the transmission of 
HPAI shocks through various stages of the broiler supply chain and through other livestock 
and related agricultural markets. The impacts of shocks are determined by the behavior of 
market agents who are involved in the transactions. Price characterizes the linkages between 
markets. Food scares can have differential effects on downstream suppliers and upstream 
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suppliers, i.e., the extent to which price adjustments may be asymmetric. As example, both 
Sanjuán and Dawson (2003) and Lloyd et al. (2006) found that the retail price of beef 
decreased significantly less than farm level price in response to BSE outbreaks in U.K., and 
resulted in a substantial increase in the farm-retail margin and widening the food crisis. Even 
though the causes of asymmetric price transmission are complicated and multidimensional, 
market power is a possible important explanation for this differential. Under competitive 
conditions, shocks impact prices at each marketing level equally. “If market power exists 
then the spread between retail and producer supply prices behaves differently since price 
setting by the sector with market power will be reflected in the mark down that the firms can 
earn, and so affects the spread. ” (Lloyd et al. 2006).  
Livestock, poultry and meat sectors are vertically integrated in the United States.  The 
linking of successive stages of production and marketing through ownership or contracting is 
widespread. For example, over 90 percent of the total production in broiler industry and more 
than a third of eggs are under ownership integration and contracts (Martinez 2002). 
Particularly, the processing industries become much more concentrated. Large processing 
establishments dominate production in all major meat sectors. In the year of 2005, the four 
largest processors accounted for 79%, 64% and 53% of purchases in cattle, hog and broiler 
industry, respectively (USDA 2009). Vertical integration between producing and processing 
activities in the meat industry results in reduced transaction costs, more uniformed food 
products and gains in economic efficiency. However, this vertical integration generally 
increases market power as shown below, and could increase welfare loss from an HPAI 
outbreak. With the increased importance of vertical integration, local farmers have access to 
only a few buyers and may be forced to accept a reduced distribution of profit or increased 
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risk. Transportation costs, time of harvest, storage costs, or local specificity could limit the 
area over which products can be shipped (MacDonald et al. 2004). As MacDonald and 
colleagues (2004) indicate, contracts may extend market power by deterring entry by 
potential rivals, limiting price competition among existing rivals and facilitating 
discriminatory pricing.   
In this paper we only focus on monopsony (buyer) market power, a situation which is 
traditionally more important in livestock and meat industries than monopoly (seller) power. 
Then the question is: Do the price effects of concentration vary across markets? How would 
the distribution of economic welfare across levels among agents differ following HPAI 
shocks under the environment of market power? 
Many recent studies have conducted analyses on how Avian Influenza influences the 
economic outcomes of livestock and meat industries in the United States (Brown et al. 2007, 
Paarlberg et al. 2007, Djunaidi et al. 2007, and Fabiosa et al. 2007).However, these studies 
assume that the livestock and meat industries are competitive; none of these studies have 
accounted for market structure in modeling the price transmission of HPAI shocks. The 
principle objective of this research is to conduct an HPAI risk and cost analysis that accounts 
for potential market power within the whole meat supply chain. The paper is organized as 
follows: We next present the literature review. Then we develop a theoretical model to 
examine the potential impacts of market power on the distribution of economic welfare 
following a food scare. We then turn to empirical analysis on measuring the magnitude of 
market power for U.S. meat sectors. Next, we utilize an epidemiological-economic model to 
conduct simulation analyses on the potential spread and effects of an HPAI scare in U.S. 
broiler industry. The final section draws conclusions. 
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4.2 Review of literature 
There has been a long-established interest for professionals in gaining a greater 
understanding of the potential existence of market power in food sectors. Following the work 
of Appelbaum (1982), a number of studies have attempted to examine market power in 
agricultural markets. The GIPSA/USDA study (1996) summarized the findings of previous 
studies relating to the effects of concentration in the red meat packing industry, and 
suggested that the results on market power are “mixed” and not consistent across studies. For 
example, Schroeter (1988) found statistically significant but limited oligopsony and 
oligopoly market power in beef packing industry; Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990) showed 
packers to have market power in both livestock procurement and meat sales; whereas 
Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson (1993) found no evidence of market power in beef industry in 
1984-1986. The conflicting results among the studies are mainly because of limitations in the 
research methods or data. With recent consolidation in the red meat sector, the newer studies 
may be more relevant. The authors that found evidence of market power in the beef and pork 
packing industry include Muth and Wohlgenant (1999), Quagrainie, Unterschultz, Veeman 
and Jeffrey (2003).However, only a few studies have examined the broiler sector to see if 
buyers exert a significant amount of market power. Bernard and Willett (1996) analyzed 
asymmetric price relationships in U.S. broiler industry on both the regional and national 
levels. Vukina and Leegomonchai (2006) illustrated the poultry grower’s hold-up problem. 
Their results showed moderate empirical evidence that the grower’s under-investment 
behavior depends on the integrator’s market power in the broiler industry production 
contract. Key and MacDonald (2008) suggested a “small but economically meaningful 
effect” of local monopsony power in U.S. broiler industry using farm survey data.     
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There is a rich of literature investigating the farm-retail price margin and what factors 
influence price transmission in agricultural economics. High concentration as well as 
increased vertical dependencies in agricultural sectors is evident in most developed countries. 
Suppliers may pass only a small fraction of an input cost decrease to output price or pass all 
of input cost increase to output price (or both) in the environment of potential market power. 
Thus price signals are allowed to be passed up or down by market agents to capture welfare 
and profits for themselves relative to the competitive market (Azzam 1999, Meyer and von 
Cramon-Taubadel 2004, Miller and Hayenga 2001, Lopez, Azzam and Liron-Espana 2002). 
For meatpacking industries, empirical studies indicated that concentration may limit 
competition and enable meatpacking firms to exert monopoly power and keep prices low 
(Azzam 1997, Marion and Geithman 1995, Richards, Patterson and Acharya 2001). 
In this study, a major effort is directed to the modeling and analysis of HPAI impacts 
on livestock industries when taking market power into account. Hence, the estimation and 
measurement of market power is critical. A number of studies have explored the methods of 
estimating market power in food industries. The empirical implementation can be classified 
among several approaches, including: the new empirical industrial organization approach 
(Baker and Bresnahan 1985); alternative reduced-form or nonparametric approaches (Panzar 
and Rosse 1987, Hall 1988); and a structural model system (Just and Chern 1980, Bresnahan 
1982, Schroeter and Azzam 1990, Liang 1989, Cotterill 1994, Vickuer and Davies 1999). 
Hyde and Jeffrey (1999) developed a new technique for measuring market power in 
Australian beef, lamb, and pork markets simultaneously by extending the structural approach  
which allows estimation for more than one product.  
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4.3 Theoretical framework 
We first develop a theoretical model to illustrate the potential impacts of market power 
on the price margin and the distribution of economic welfare following a food scare such as 
an HPAI outbreak. Following the assumption used in Schroeter and Azzam’s study (1990), 
we assume “the existence of fully integrated firms spanning the farm-to-retail meat 
marketing channel and ignore all vertical relationships within the industry”. This implies we 
do not decompose the farm-retail margin into farm-wholesale and wholesale-retail margins to 
identify if the exercise of market power occurs at the wholesale level or at the retail level. 
The model structure includes: producer supply, consumer demand on final product and retail 
supply. We assume that the final products produced by all firms are homogenous, and the 
industry technology is characterized by constant return to scale. Furthermore, to concentrate 
the model on the implications of market power, we simply assume the input-output 
coefficient to be 1. The food shocks enter into the model by taking the form of exogenous 
demand and/or supply shifters.            
The inverse producer’s supply can be expressed as 
( )0 , sp f q Z=                                                        (4.1) 
where 0p  is the price received by the producer, and q  is producer supply. sZ denotes supply 
shifter caused by the food scare or outbreak. 
The consumer’s inverse demand for the retail product is 
( ), dp D q Z=                                                         (4.2) 
where p represents retail price. dZ  denotes demand shifter caused by the food scare. 
The representative firm’s profit maximization can be expressed as 
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     ( ) ( )' 'p p q q C qλ+ =                                                      (4.3) 
where λ  represents the level of market power, and the value of λ  ranges from zero (perfect 
competition) to one (monopsony). Values lying between these two extremes imply the 
presence of an intermediate degree of market power. ( )'C q  is the marginal cost of the firm 
and can be assumed as a linear function of producer level price 0p  and marketing cost w .  
( )' 0C q p w= +                                                         (4.4) 
Let ( )( )/ /q p p qη = ∂ ∂  which is less than zero denote the price elasticity of demand in 
the retail market, then equation (4.3) can be rearranged as 
 01p p wλη
⎛ ⎞+ = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠                                                      (4.5) 
In order to obtain the industry-level expression of equation (4.5), we need to aggregate 
among firms. The industry-level conjectural variation interpreter industryλ  can be estimated as 
the weighted average of individual conjectural variation interpreter λ , with firms’ market 
shares as weights. As in many studies of market power (e.g., Azzam and Pagoulatos; Lopez, 
Wann and Sexton), we simply assume that the market share of each firm on the final market 
is identical. Thus, the conjectural variation interpreter at the industry level is industryλ λ= .  
         Using (4.1), (4.2) and (4.5), the endogenous variables ( )* 0* *, ,q p p  can be derived by 
implicit solutions. The price spread * * 0*r p p= −  can provide insight on how market power 
would change the impacts of the shocks. If market power exists, the exogenous shocks 
influence the prices at different supply chain stages to varying degrees. As a result, the price 
margin might be widened or narrowed depending on the demand elasticities as well as 
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interactions of exogenous shifters. In the meantime, market power plays a role in determining 
the magnitude and distribution of welfare impacts. The producer’s surplus  * * *V p q=  can be 
expressed as a function of price elasticities vector η , marketing cost w  and market power 
parameter λ . In general form, the impacts of a demand shock and a supply shock caused by 
HPAI can be provided by  
( ) ( )0* , , , ,
d d d
p w p wdr
dZ Z Z
η λ η λ∂ ∂= −∂ ∂                                          
(4.6) 
( ) ( )0* , , , ,
s s s
p w p wdr
dZ Z Z
η λ η λ∂ ∂= −∂ ∂                                         
(4.7) 
and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* , , , ,, , , ,
d d d
p w q wdV q w p w
dZ Z Z
η λ η λη λ η λ∂ ∂= ⋅ − ⋅∂ ∂                   
(4.8)
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* , , , ,, , , ,
s s s
p w q wdV q w p w
dZ Z Z
η λ η λη λ η λ∂ ∂= ⋅ − ⋅∂ ∂                  
(4.9)
 
respectively. 
          In the beef and pork industries, marketing contracts are the prevalent method of 
vertical coordination. The marketing contract mainly specifies delivered quantities, product 
specification, compensation and quality control (MacDonald et al. 2004). The farmer makes 
most of his or her decisions which include how much to produce and how to produce. Here 
0p  is farm level price, i.e, steer price for the beef industry and barrow-gilt price for the pork 
industry. 
           Unlike the beef and pork industries, most farms in the broiler, egg and turkey 
industries are linked to an integrator through production contracts. In a production contract, 
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the integrator engages in many of the farmer’s decisions like providing chicks, feed, 
veterinary services and retains ownership of important production inputs. In most cases, 
farmers invest only in production facilities according to the firm’s specifications and certain 
management strategies. Under production contracts, farmers are paid for farming services, 
not for the products. Therefore, here, the producer’s price 0p  is the wholesale level price 
instead of the farm level price. The impacts of market power will be transmitted along the 
whole supply chain and result in a different new market equilibrium compared with prefect 
competition. 
 
4.4 Empirical analysis 
 
4.4.1 Measurement of market power 
To examine the impacts of market structure on economic outcomes in the food sector 
following an HPAI scare, it is important to measure the market power that might exist for 
each product within the livestock and meat sectors. Our study draws upon the method of 
Hyde and Jeffrey (1999) who simultaneously estimated an Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS) model for Australia’s retail meat sectors, a market power parameter and a marginal 
cost function for each product. This approach is more efficient than examining each good in 
isolation because “it makes use of information obtained from demand theory, such as price 
homogeneity restriction” (Hyde and Jeffrey 1999).  Due to the substitution between meat 
products on the demand side, the prices of all meat products are included in the demand 
functions for each meat product. This enables us to capture substitution between meat 
products by consumers in response to relative price changes, which is important for 
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examining the net impacts on one specific market. We modify Hyde and Jeffrey’s model by 
analyzing market power in the whole supply chain instead of at the retail level only. In our 
study, the model estimates simultaneously the demand of major meat products: chicken, 
pork, beef, turkey and egg.  
The demand component recognizes that in the very short run, meat production is 
essentially fixed, and thus price determination is at the retail level. The demand component 
also recognizes that the consumers’ adjustment to changes in relative prices and income is 
not instantaneous, and consumers of the five meat products have preferences that are weakly 
separable.  
The AIDS model includes expenditure share equations for the meat-poultry products 
that are related to the logarithm of total expenditure and the logarithms of relative prices. The 
model can be written as follows: 
( )5 1 ln ln /i i ij j ijs p X Pα γ β== + +∑                                      (4.10) 
where is  represent the share of commodity  i, jp  denotes the retail price of good j , X  is 
the total expenditure on the five meat products, and P is price index which is defined as: 
( )50 1ln ln 1/ 2 ln lni ij i ji i jP p p pα γ== + +∑ ∑ ∑                        (4.11) 
The AIDS model satisfies the aggregation restriction 5 5
1 1
1, 0,i ii iα β= == =∑ ∑  and 
homogeneity, 5
1
0ijj γ= =∑ , and symmetry, ij jiγ γ=  ,which can be imposed with parametric 
restrictions automatically.  
In order to examine the potential impacts of market power on price reaction elasticities, 
the “integrated” firm’s profit maximization conditions are considered to be endogenous in the 
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demand system. One of the favorable characteristics of AIDS model is that it is plausible to 
incorporate theoretical restrictions on the system.  
          Recall the firm’s maximization problem 
( ) ( )' 'i i i i i i ip p q q C qλ+ =                                            (4.12) 
where [ ]0,1iλ ∈  is the parameter that captures market power (conjectural variation). That is, 
in a competitive market, we expect iλ  is equal to zero.  
( )'i iC q is the marginal cost of product i . Differing from Hyde and Jeffrey’s study, in 
this study 0ip  and w  denote producer price and marketing cost along the whole supply chain, 
respectively. 
( )' 0i i i i i iC q a b p d w= + +                                                   (4.13) 
By substituting the (4.13) and ( )'i ip q  derived from the AIDS model into (4.12), the first 
order condition can be rewritten as  
1
0 1
1 /
j ji i i
i i i i i
j ii ij i j ii i i
p qsp a b p d w
q s s
λ λ
γ β γ β
−
≠
⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞= + + − × −⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟− − +⎢ ⎥ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∑              (4.14) 
Then the AIDS model is estimated using a double logarithmic demand system by imposing 
parameter restrictions and the profit maximization restriction (4.14). The market power 
parameter iλ  can be obtained. The magnitude of price asymmetry depends not only on the 
level of market power but also on the demand elasticities. The data used in the demand 
system are obtained from USDA/ERS and NASS. The estimation in this study is based on a 
sample consisting of 96 quarterly observations that cover the period 1981:1 - 2004:4. The 
regression results are listed in table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1. Model estimates 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
1α   -0.0012 44γ  -0.0096 1d   0.0163*** 
2α    0.1432*** 45γ  0.0000*** 2d   0.0021*** 
3α    1.0152*** 55γ  0.0393*** 3d   0.0014** 
4α   -0.0016*** 1β   0.1269*** 4d   0.0000*** 
5α   -0.1557*** 2β  0.0256*** 5d   0.0001*** 
11γ   0.0903*** 3β  -0.2123*** 0a   0.0000 
12γ  -0.0527*** 4β   0.0054*** 1λ   0.0342*** 
13γ  -0.0161*** 1a   -0.0060*** 2λ   0.0499*** 
14γ   0.0378*** 2a   -0.0010*** 3λ   0.1607*** 
15γ  -0.0594*** 3a   -0.0007 4λ   -0.0015 
22γ   0.0981*** 4a   0.0001* 5λ   0.00004 
23γ  -0.0089*** 5a  0.0033*   
24γ  -0.0373*** 1b   0.00001   
25γ   0.0009*** 2b   0.0000   
33γ   -0.0033 3b   0.00002**   
34γ   0.0091*** 4b  0.00000   
35γ   0.0192*** 5b  0.00008*   
Note: *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance level 
                                                    1-beef; 2-pork; 3-poultry; 4-turkey; 5-egg 
 
          Table 4.1 lists coefficients of statistical inference. Most parameters are statistical 
significant at the 5% level or less. These findings indicate the estimated market power index 
λ   is statistically significant for the beef, pork and chicken sectors, which suggests that to 
some extent market power exists in these industries. The results also indicate that the overall 
concentration on the national level is quite small in terms of magnitude. 
 
4.4.2 Economic impacts of HPAI under market power 
 
4.4.2.1 Economic model 
An epidemiological-economic model is developed to simulate the spread and effects of  
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the disease in the poultry and other meat sectors. This approach differs from the study of 
Lloyd et al. (2006) which adopted a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to verify the 
influences of BSE disease on the farm-retail margin. Instead, here, a state-transition model of 
the transmission of Avian Influenza developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
(LLNL) was used along with an economic model. The epidemiological model was developed 
to incorporate the dynamics of influenza A virus infection with birds and estimate the effect 
of different risk profiles on the final disease prevalence and infection rate. (Please refer to 
Fabiosa et al. for further details and references.) The economic model developed by the 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University uses 
parameters generated by the epidemiological model to validate the potential effects of shocks 
associated with the disease on prices along the supply chain, domestic consumption, export, 
production and ending stock under different scenarios.   
The CARD model is a multimarket partial equilibrium model and provides a complete 
depiction of key biological and economic relationships within five livestock and meat 
industries. The modeling effort updates previous work described in Jensen et al. (1989), and 
Buhr and Hayenga (1994). The model revisions accommodate updated results from re-
estimated market models, added livestock sectors, and new technical production parameters. 
The model allows for components envisioned in the simulations of an Avian Influenza 
outbreak in broiler and egg industry. The current extended model system includes five meat 
sectors: broiler and chicken meat; turkey and turkey meat; layer and eggs; beef cattle and 
beef; and hog and pork. Each market in the model is assumed to be national in scope, and has 
a single national equilibrium price.  
The structure of the model includes live animal supply, meat supply, meat demand, and 
 
101 
 
price margin components. The econometric specification provides an abstraction of a 
complex system and aids in synthesizing information and causal relationships into a 
comprehensible form. Aggregate demand and supply can be partitioned to equations that 
define the behavior relationship between quantities and price and other event factors. The 
specification of the five supply sectors is based on a partial adjustment-adaptive expectations 
framework and is driven by the feed cost variable, output price and expected output on 
particular stages. The processes include biological restrictions inherent in livestock 
production, the appropriate lags to capture time periods required in production, technical 
parameters, and accounting identities to ensure consistency in the stock as well as flow 
variables. Relevant trade flows for the products involved are also modeled. In a word, the 
supply components of the models are determined by the biological relationship in the 
production process as well as on the economic considerations of meat producers. 
Under the assumption that supply is fixed in the short run (less than one quarter), the 
meat demand system is estimated by an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) which 
includes expenditure share equations for the all meat products. The linkage takes the 
assumption that consumers adjust their purchasing behaviors based on relative retail meat 
prices and the cross-commodity effects originate on the demand side. The marginal 
specifications provide a price linkage from the farm market to the retail market. The potential 
existence of market power and the optimal production condition for each sector are not 
included in CARD model. In this study, we update the estimation of the AIDS demand 
system by taking market power and its consequent impacts on economic outcomes into 
account. 
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The model has a simultaneous econometric framework where market equilibrium price 
and quantity for the five livestock sectors are jointly determined. Economic activity is 
initiated by the breeding decisions of livestock producers, and these are linked recursively to 
all other variables of the model system and simultaneously interact to determine each other’s 
value. The supply and demand sides of each model are linked by market clearing conditions. 
Current prices influence future production and current consumption decisions. For this 
analysis, input markets are assumed to be exogenous. When the scenarios introduce a shock, 
responses captured through elasticities on the endogenous variables will shift the demand or 
supply curve, and thus induces price movements.  Thereafter supply recovers gradually and 
stable supply path can be obtained again.  A new equilibrium is achieved in which supply 
and demand are in balance. While a shock on the broiler industry may have an initial impact 
on the industry itself, the interdependencies between the industries and the supply chain 
integration ensure that the others are also affected to some extent. The influences of the 
shocks are different because of the differences in the endogenous variables’ elasticities and in 
the relative variability of the series for the endogenous variables. The effects of market 
power involve adjustments on demand elasticities, which influence equilibrium prices and 
quantities, as well as the distribution of social cost through market relationships. 
 
4.4.2.2 Scenarios 
Following Fabiosa et al. (2007), the simulated market scenarios are classified 
according to the length and severity of the outbreak, number of birds removed from the 
market, percentage reduction in domestic and export demand for poultry products, duration 
of the demand shock, assumptions on diversion, and use of product destined for export 
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markets. Since it is challenging to know in advance the range of an outbreak, this study 
examines three possible scenarios of the extent of HPAI on broilers and layers: high, medium 
and low. The epidemiological model generates data on infection rates and effects on national 
broiler production required by the economic model. An infection rate of 0.2% and duration of 
90 days are generated for the low shock scenario. Infection rate and duration for medium and 
high shock scenarios are 0.4% and 180 days, 0.7% and 270 days, respectively. There is 
depopulation of pullets, chicks hatched and slaughter ready birds, applied in equal 
percentages to each sector spread out during the period of the outbreak.  
On the domestic demand side, consumers are assumed to respond to an AI outbreak by 
decreasing purchase of chicken during the quarter when the outbreak happens. The 
decreasing level is 5%, 8% and 14% for low, medium and high scenarios, respectively. For 
the high scenario, the consumption decreases by 10% on the quarter following outbreak, 
while these is no decline on the following quarters for low and medium scenario. 
For export, we assume export would be 50%, 25% and 10% below normal levels for 
high, medium and low scenarios, and shocks on export market fade over after 135, 270, and 
405 days, respectively. A further issue is what happens to product destined for export should 
it be banned from the export market. If none of the retained product is “diverted” to 
secondary or alternative markets (e.g., pet food, rendered product, or other country 
destinations), this is termed 0% diverted, and all the banned export product is consumed in 
the United States. The product is either exported, consumed domestically, or added to ending 
stocks (cold storage). If all product is diverted (i.e., none is consumed by U.S. consumers), 
then 100% is diverted to low-valued, alternative use or disposed of. For each of the three 
scenarios (low, medium, and high), three levels of export diversion, 0%, 50%, and 100%, are 
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considered. The assumptions underlying the scenarios for disease outbreaks for egg layers 
can be described similarly. The assumptions of each scenario are summarized in Table 4.2 
(See Appendix). 
 
4.4.2.3 Empirical results 
The data used in the economic model include time-series data on the levels of 
production, price, consumption, exports, and stock for the period between the year of 1981 
and 2004. The model is also calibrated by dynamic simulation over the same periods. 
Through calibration, the baseline-solved value of the endogenous variables equals the actual 
value. The baseline projections are developed in the first quarter of 2000 and cover the period 
2000.1-2004.2. Effects of alternative scenarios are measured relative to this period. The firm-
level production impacts and market-level changes in equilibrium prices and output are 
evaluated. Table 4.3 and Figure 4.6-4.12 (in the Appendix) provide simulation results of the 
broiler sector for the base line and the high-range shock with 0% export diversion under the 
environment of market power. The first four quarters of the scenarios are listed individually 
in the table and the remaining quarters are averaged annually since the impacts of external 
shocks are becoming smaller. The results from other cases and other sectors are not listed 
here because of space limitations. 
The simulation results indicate that if HPAI is introduced into the United States, 
restrictions imposed on chicken trade will result in excess supply in the domestic market. 
Consequently, the HPAI market price of poultry products is lower than before because 
producers are not able to adjust production decisions in the very short run. From Table 4.3, a 
50% decrease in export results in approximately a 35% decrease in the retail chicken price. 
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After trade restrictions are removed, the simulation reveals chicken prices recover above the 
level without an HPAI shock. Producers respond to the reduction of poultry prices by 
operating on a lower production function. But the long run impact of the HPAI shock on 
production is generally quite small.  Only a larger demand or supply shock results in 
production decreasing by more than one percent from the baseline scenario. Producers are 
able to recover after the shock and sometimes achieve higher production than before the 
shock. As the retail price decreases, the ending stocks and per capita consumption of chicken 
increase due to the decrease in retail price.  
The HPAI shocks also affect the other meat markets to some extent. For example, the 
AI outbreak has a negative demand shock on poultry. At the same time, the increase in 
chicken supply dominates market response and market prices decrease. The fall in poultry 
prices has a negative effect on demand for other meat products and leads a decrease in the 
prices in other meat markets. The magnitude of the substitution effect depends on 
substitution elasticities among these meat products and the degree of market power.   
Table 4.5 presents the simulation results of chicken’s total value under the environment 
of market power in comparison to a situation with perfect competition ( )0λ = . We can find 
the absolute value of the change in chicken’s total value is higher with the existence of 
market power. That is, market power is more likely to lead to a higher change in the 
producer’s surplus and deepen the effects of HPAI. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the 
difference between the two scenarios is low and it amounts to no more than 0.2% in term of 
changes in case of perfect competition. The vertical dashed line in the figure separates the 
periods with trade restrictions and without restrictions (when they are relaxed). 
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Figure 4.1. Percentage change in chicken's total value (with and without market power) 
 
The changing patterns of the egg-layer sector are similar to those observed in the 
poultry sector except that per-capita consumption of eggs decreases from the beginning. 
Simulation results are summarized in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.13-4.19 (in the Appendix). For 
egg- layer sector, there are almost no differences between the simulations in case of perfect 
competition and market power. This is not surprising because we found no market power in 
egg-layer industry. 
Now let’s address the question of whether and how much market power influences the 
price margin along the supply chain. Although the existence of market power has varying 
impacts on different meat products, we focus on the broiler sector and layer sector only. As 
we indicated before, the farmers are paid for farming services instead of products. We 
analyze if there is a change in price margin at the retail level relative to the wholesale level in 
the presence of the HPAI shock. 
Without the existence of market power, the demand and supply shocks play no role in 
determining the price margin. Correspondingly, if market power does characterize the 
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market, then the demand or/and the supply shifter might influence the wholesale and retail 
prices to varying degrees and thus change the price margin.  The econometric analyses of 
Lloyd et al. (2006) show that the price margin is positively affected by the demand shifter 
and negatively affected by the supply shifter. Whether and how the food scares change the 
price margin depends on which effect is dominant. We denote by 0ip  and 1ip  the baseline (no 
shock) and forecasted (with shock) poultry prices, where i indicates the wholesale ( )i w=
and retail ( )i r=  levels. Then we can obtain the change of the forecasted price margin and 
the baseline price margin ( ) ( )1 1 0 0r w r wp p p p− −− . Table 4.6 and Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the 
change in poultry price margin resulting from an HPAI outbreak. 
         
Figure 4.2. Wholesale - Retail poultry                       Figure 4.3. Change in Wholesale - Retail 
    price margin                                                                poultry price margin 
                                                                                                                          
The results illustrated in figures 4.2 and 4.3 suggest that the wholesale-retail margin of 
poultry products decreases for the first eight quarters following the shock. Recall that 
immediately after the outbreak of HPAI, the large scale export ban (supply shifter) leads to 
excess supply in domestic market. Due to the lag structure of supply functions, the trade 
restriction causes the retail price to decrease more than the wholesale price, and thus narrows 
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the price margin. At the same time, the concern over food safety among consumers (demand 
shifter) also leads to lower retail price. Because impacts of the demand shock are greater on 
the upstream rather than downstream level with the existence of market power, the demand 
shock has the effect of widening the price margin. The decrease in price margin in this period 
suggests that the impacts of the supply shock dominate.  
After the trade restriction is removed, the impact of the supply shock diminishes. On 
the demand side, the retail price rebounds with the recovery of poultry consumption. The 
wholesale level price response is lower than the retail price response.  The impact of the 
demand shifter is greater than that of the supply shifter. Therefore, from the ninth quarter 
after the outbreak, the wholesale-retail price margin starts to increase and becomes wider. 
The results are consistent with the empirical findings of Bernard and Willett (1996) who 
indicated that the national retail price of poultry products showed upward asymmetry from 
the wholesale to retail level. Because the magnitude of market power is relatively low in the 
poultry market, we find the change in the price margin is quite small in absolute value and 
remains nearly constant in the long run.  
          
Figure 4.4. Wholesale - Retail egg                         Figure 4.5. Change in Wholesale - Retail 
price margin                                                                egg price margin 
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     The changes in egg price margin resulting from the HPAI shock are represented by        
Table 4.7 and Figures 4.4 and 4.5. The results indicate that the supply shock leads the price 
margin to decrease immediately after the outbreak of HPAI. Since there does not exist 
market power in egg-layer sector, the price margin is not affected by the food scare after the 
trade restriction is removed. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
This study is motivated by the lack of knowledge about the market structure’s 
influence on the U.S. meat sectors following a potential HPAI shock on the broiler industry. 
A simulation approach is used to analyze the responses of producers and consumers on a 
potential HPAI scare in a market setting. Specifically, this study recognizes that suppliers in 
the meat industry may exert market power to make adjustments that affect the market 
environment in which they operate. The results suggest that the poultry retail price margin 
relative to the wholesale level of poultry products becomes smaller immediately after an 
HPAI outbreak (or shock) and then becomes wider with the recovery of poultry consumption. 
However, the results show that the magnitude of market power is relatively low in poultry 
market. Further work could be done to analyze the potential impacts of market power by 
relaxing the assumption that total expenditure on all meat products is fixed. Moreover, 
sensitivity of these simulation results could be examined to regional data.           
  
 
110 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Appelbaum, E. 1982.  “The Estimation of the Degree of Oligopoly Power.” Journal of 
Econometrics 19: 287-299. 
Azzam, A.M. 1999. “Asymmetry and Rigidity in Farm-Retail Price Transmission.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 81(3): 525-533. 
Azzam, A. M. 1997. “Measuring market power and cost-efficiency effects of industrial   
concentration.” Journal of Industrial Economics 45: 377–86. 
Azzam, A.M. and E. Pagoulatos. 1990.” Testing Oligopolistic and Oligopsonistic Behaviour: 
An Application to the US Meat-Packing Industry.”  Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 41: 362-370. 
Bailey, D. V. and B. W. Brorsen. 1989. “Price Asymmetry in Spatial Fed Cattle Markets.” 
Western Journal of Agricultural Economics 14: 246-52. 
Baker, J.B. and T.F. Bresnahan. 1985. “The Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product-
Differentiated Industries.” Journal of Industrial Economics 33: 427-443. 
Ball, L. and N. G. Mankiw. 1994. “Asymmetric Price Adjustment and Economic 
Fluctuations.” Economic Journal 104: 247-261. 
Beach. R.H.,C. Poulos and S. K. Pattanayaks. 2007. “Farm Economics of Bird Flu.” 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 55: 473-485. 
Beach. R.H.,C. Poulos and S. K. Pattanayaks. 2007. “Agricultural Household Response to 
Avian Influenza Prevention and Control Policies.” Journal of Agricultural and 
Applied Economics 39 (2): 301-311. 
Bernard, J.C. and L.S. Willett. 1996. “Asymmetric Price Relationships in the U.S.Broiler 
Industry.” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 28 (2): 279-289. 
Blinder, A. S., E. R. Canetti, D. E. Lebow and J. B. Rudd. 1998. “Asking About Prices: A 
New Approach to Understanding Price Stickiness.” New York: Sage Foundation. 
 
111 
 
Bresnahan, T. F. 1982. “The oligopoly solution concept is identified.” Economic Letters 10: 
87-92. 
Brown, S., D. Madison, H.L. Goodwin and F. D. Clark. 2007. “Potential Effects on United 
States Agriculture of an Avian Influenza Outbreak.” Journal of Agricultural and 
Applied Economics 39 (2): 335-343. 
Buhr, B.L., and M.L. Hayenga. 1994. “Ex-ante Evaluation of the Economic Impacts of 
Growth Promotants in the U.S. Livestock and Meat Sector.” Review of Agricultural 
Economics. 16(2): 159-73. 
Cotterill, RW. 1994. “Scanner Data New Opportunities for Demand and Competitive 
Strategy Analysis.” Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 23: 125–139. 
Djunaidi, H., A. and C. M. Djunaidi. 2007. “Economic Impacts of Avian Influenza on World 
Poultry Trade and the U.S. Poultry Industry: A Spatial Equilibrium Analysis.” 
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 39(2): 313-323. 
Fabiosa, J., H.H. Jensen and J. Liang. 2007. “CARD Livestock Model Documentation 
(draft).” Project Report. CARD, Iowa State University. 
Gardner, B.L. 1975. “The Farm-Retail Price Spread in a Competitive Food Industry.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 57: 383-406. 
GIPSA. 1996. Concentration in the Red Meat Packing Industry. Packers and Stockyards 
Programs, Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyard Administration, U.S. Department 
of Agriculture.  
Hall, R. E. 1988. “The relationship between price and marginal cost in US industry.”  
Journal of Political Economy 96 (5): 921-47. 
Hyde, C.E. and M.P. Jeffery. 1999. “Multimarket market power estimation: the Australian 
retail meat sector.” Applied Economics 1998 (30): 1169-1176. 
 
112 
 
Hogs and Pigs Yearbook.1968-2009. National Agricultural Statistics Service. 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1086 
Jensen, H. H., S. R. Johnson, S. Y.  Shin and K. Skold. 1989. “CARD Livestock Model 
Documentation: poultry.” Technical Report 88-TR3, Iowa State University. 
Just, R. E. and W. S. Chern. 1980. “Tomatoes, technology, and oligopsony.”  Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 11(2): 584- 602. 
Key Facts about Avian Influenza (Bird Flu) and Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus. 2006. 
CDC Fact Sheet. http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/facts.htm 
Key, N and J.M. MacDonald. 2008. “Local Monopsony Power in the Market for Broilers? 
Evidence from a Farm Survey.”  Selected Paper at the Annual Meeting of the AAEA, 
Orlando, Florida, July 27-29. 
Kinucan, H. W. and O. D. Forker. 1987. “Asymmetry in Farm-Retail Price Transmission for 
Major Dairy Products.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69: 307-328. 
Koontz. S., P. Garcia and M. Hudson. 1993. “Meatpacker conduct in fed cattle pricing: An 
investigation of oligopsony power.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75 
(3): 537–548. 
Liang, J.N. 1989. “Price Reaction Functions and Conjectural Variations: An Application to 
the Breakfast Cereal Industry.” Review of Industrial Organization 4: 31-58. 
Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry Outlook. 1995-2009. Economic Research Service, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/ldp/ 
Lloyd, T., S. McCorriston, W. Morgan and H. Weldegebriel. 2006. “Buyer Market Power in 
UK Food Retailing.” Centre for Policy Evaluation working paper. School of 
Economics, University of Nottingham, UK. 
Lopez R.A., A.M. Azzam and C. Liron-Espana. 2002. “Market Power and/or Efficiency: A 
Structural Approach.” Review of Industrial Organization 20: 115-126. 
 
113 
 
MacDonald, J., J. Perry, M. Ahearn, D. Banker, W. Chambers, C. Dimitri, N. Key, K. Nelson  
and L. Southard. 2004. “Contracts, Markets, and Prices: Organizing the Production 
and Use of Agricultural Commodities.” USDA ERS Report 837. 
Marion, B. and F. Geithman. 1995. “Concentration–price relations in regional fed cattle              
markets.”  Review of Industrial Organization 10: 1-19. 
Martinez, S.W. 2002. “A Comparison of Vertical Coordination in the U.S. Poultry, Egg, and 
Pork Industries.” USDA ERS Report No. 747-05. 
Meyer, J. and S. von Cramon-Taubadel. 2004.  “Asymmetric Price Transmission: A Survey.” 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 55: 581-611. 
Miller, D.J. and M.L. Hayenga.2001. “Price Cycles and Asymmetric Price Transmission in 
the US Pork Market.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 83: 551-562. 
Muth, K. M. and M. K. Wohlgenant. 1999. “Measuring the degree of oligopsony power in 
the beef packing industry in the absence of marketing input quantity data.” Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics 24 (2): 299–312. 
Narrod, C. 2009. “Commentary: The Costs of a Pandemic.” IFPRI Forum 2009, Volume 3. 
Paarlberg, P.L., A. H. Seitzinger and J.G. Lee. 2007. “Economic Impacts of Regionalization 
of a Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak in the United States.” Journal of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics 39 (2): 325:333. 
Panzar, J. C. and J. N. Rosse. 1987. “Testing for monopoly equilibrium.” Journal of 
Industrial Economics 35(4): 443-56. 
Peltzman, S. 2000. “Prices rise faster than they fall.” Journal of Political Economy 108: 466-
502. 
Poultry Yearbook. 1960-2004. Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.         
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1367 
 
114 
 
Quagrainie, K., J. Unterschultz, M. Veeman. and S. Jeffrey. 2003. “Testing for Processor 
Market Power in the Markets for Cattle and Hogs in Canada.” Canadian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 51 (3): 397-412. 
Reagan, P. and M. Weitzman.1982. “Asymmetries in price and quantity adjustments by the 
competitive firm.”Journal of Economic Theory 27: 410–420. 
Red Meat Yearbook.1970-2005. Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture.http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?docum
entID=1354. 
Richards, T. J., P. M. Patterson and R. N. Acharya. 2001. “Price behavior in dynamic 
oligopsony: Washington processing potatoes.” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 83 (2): 259–71. 
Sanjuán, A. I. and P.J. Dawson. 2003. “Price transmission, BSE and structural breaks in the 
UK meat sector.” European Review of Agricultural Economics 30: 155-172. 
Serra, T. and B.K. Goodwin. 2003. “Transmission and Asymmetric Adjustment in the 
Spanish Dairy Sector.” Applied Economics 35: 1889–1899. 
Schroeter, J.R. 1988. “Estimating the Degree of Market Power in the Beef Packing Industry.” 
The Review of Economics and Statistics 70:  158-163. 
Schroeter, J. R. and A.  Azzam. 1990. “Measuring market power in multi-product 
oligopolies: The US meat industry.” Applied Economics 22 (10): 1365- 76. 
USDA Report. 2000. “Consolidation in U.S. Meatpacking.” Economic Research Service. 
Report No. 785. 
USDA Report. 2009. “The Transformation of U.S. Livestock Agriculture Scale, Efficiency, 
and Risks.” Economic Information Bulletin Number 43. 
 
115 
 
Vickner, S.S. and S.P. Davies. 1999. “Estimating Market Power and Pricing Conduct in a 
Product-Differentiated Oligopoly: The Case of the Domestic Spaghetti Sauce 
Industry.”Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 31: 1-13. 
Vukina, T. and P. Leegomonchai. 2006. “Oligopsony power, asset specificity, and hold-up: 
Evidence from the broiler industry.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
88(3):589-605. 
Wann, J.J. and Sexton. R.J. 1992 “Imperfect competition in multi-product food industries 
with an application to pear processing.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
72:  980–990. 
Wohlgenant, M.K. 1985." Competitive Storage, Rational Expectations, and Short-Run Food 
Price Determination." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 67: 739–748. 
Zachariasse, V. and F. Bunte. 2003. “How are farmers faring in the changing balance of 
power along the food supply chain?”  OECD Conference: Changing Dimensions of 
the Food Economy: Exploring the Policy Issues, The Hague, 6-7 February. 
  
 
116 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
Table 4.2. Assumptions used in scenario analysis 
 
 
Broiler scenarios
 
Range  
  
Outbreak 
duration 
(days)  
 Broilers 
infected  
 Fraction 
broiler 
industry 
infected  
Fraction of broiler 
industry affected 
by export bans 
exported 
Export 
ban 
duration 
(days) 
Consumer 
demand shift 
during 
outbreak 
Consumer 
demand shift, in 
quarter 
following 
outbreak 
low 90 2,500,000 0.2% 10% 135 5% 0% 
med 180 5,000,000 0.4% 25% 270 8% 0% 
high 270 10,000,000 0.7% 50% 405 14% 10% 
Layer scenarios
Range 
  
Outbreak 
duration 
(days)  
 Layers 
infected  
 Fraction 
layer 
industry 
infected  
Fraction of broiler 
industry affected 
by export bans 
exported 
Export 
ban 
duration 
(days) 
Consumer 
demand shift 
during 
outbreak 
Consumer 
demand shift, in 
quarter 
following 
outbreak 
low 90 1,475,060 0.5% 10% 135 5% 0% 
med 180 14,750,600 5.0% 10% 270 8% 0% 
high 270 29,500,000 10.0% 10% 405 14% 10% 
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Table 4.3. Broiler sector simulation results for the high-range scenario (baseline and 0% export diversion) 
 
  
Broilers unit 2000.00 2000.25 2000.50 2000.75 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Baseline 
Per Capita Consumption  Retail lb 23.46 23.85 22.99 22.68 23.42 24.86 25.40 26.34 
Export Thousand lbs 1135383.7 1189349.8 1275979.6 1317640.6 1388821.1 1201783.1 1230003.2 1014866.8 
Ending Stock Thousand lbs 795596.0 811422.0 815723.0 810293.0 682990.5 798225.3 662037.5 604163.5 
Wholesale Price $/cwt 54.58 55.70 56.81 57.56 59.11 55.52 61.96 76.25 
Retail Price $/lb 1.53 1.56 1.57 1.55 1.58 1.62 1.62 1.71 
Production Thousand lbs 7603368.0 7754304.0 7593955.0 7543544.0 7816452.2 8059930.5 8187249.0 8343283.0 
Total Value  (Retail 
Price*Production) Thousand $ 11662761 12095972 11919678 11688814 12327614 13044947 13290221 14275113 
Scenario ( high 0 xd) 
Per Capita Consumption  Retail lb 25.35 24.96 23.63 23.77 23.22 24.79 25.45 26.34 
Export Thousand lbs 583927.6 609507.0 651291.2 670485.5 1299213.4 1201115.4 1229662.0 1014419.2 
Ending Stock Thousand lbs 813722.2 825608.7 827587.7 820476.6 682612.1 797899.9 661874.5 604000.0 
Wholesale Price $/cwt 11.62 22.60 30.48 38.41 67.26 57.16 62.41 77.11 
Retail Price $/lb 0.99 1.06 1.12 1.16 1.61 1.64 1.63 1.73 
Production Thousand lbs 7585902.1 7472632.4 7140643.7 7191648.7 7608896.0 8040145.5 8200621.4 8342146.0 
Total Value  (Retail 
Price*Production) Thousand $ 7513701 7946950 8029144 8335680 12234584 13192615 13405573 14398132 
Change of Total Value Thousand $ -4149059 -4149022 -3890534 -3353134 -93030 147668 115353 123019 
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Table 4.4. Layer sector simulation results for the high-range scenario (baseline and 0% export diversion) 
 
Layers unit 2000.00 2000.25 2000.50 2000.75 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Baseline 
Per Capita 
Consumption  Dozen 5.96 5.75 5.77 6.16 5.97 5.96 6.02 5.93 
Export Thousand Dozen 41037.93 37366.58 44717.83 48023.82 47485.22 43496.10 36490.88 30773.74 
Ending Stock Thousand Dozen 10626.42 10711.47 10952.16 11367.50 11466.21 9702.35 13208.43 14238.04 
Wholesale Price Cents/ dozen 68.07 66.05 68.80 86.05 70.35 69.24 79.16 89.45 
Retail Price $/ dozen 0.96 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.93 1.03 1.24 1.50 
Production Millions   1760166.7 1748833.3 1758166.7 1793833.3 1796895.8 1817645.8 1824104.2 1833083.3 
Total Value  (Retail 
Price*Production) Thousand $ 140226611 127713412 130934579 138723111 139140794 156402277 189405025 229696243 
Scenario ( high 0 xd) 
Per Capita 
Consumption  Dozen 5.70 5.27 5.17 5.70 5.84 5.96 6.02 5.93 
Export Thousand Dozen 38087.3 34240.4 40645.4 43549.1 46726.2 43478.5 36490.8 30774.3 
Ending Stock Thousand Dozen 10682.9 10754.4 10979.1 11388.1 11448.3 9701.4 13208.4 14238.1 
Wholesale Price Cents/ dozen 54.59 60.89 66.95 84.97 75.73 69.58 79.18 89.46 
Retail Price $/ dozen 0.78 0.78 0.83 0.88 0.98 1.03 1.24 1.50 
Production Millions   1685061.7 1614044.7 1589358.3 1664304.7 1758676.5 1815651.2 1824092.5 1833121.9 
Total Value  (Retail 
Price*Production) Thousand $ 109807854 105479551 110381395 121848890 143109572 156633343 189406040 229688108 
Change of Total Value Thousand $ -30418757 -22233861 -20553184 -16874221 3968778 231067 1015 -8135 
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Table 4.5. Chicken’s total value (with and without market power) 
 
 
 
  
Year 
Total Value 
(Thousand $) 
(A) 
Total Value 
(Thousand $) 
(B) 
Difference 
(Thousand $) 
(B-A) 
 
Percentage change 
(%) 
((B-A)/A*100) 
2000.00 7530444.3 7513701.5 -16742.8 -0.222 
2000.25 7962746.9 7946950.1 -15796.9 -0.198 
2000.50 8045606.1 8029143.6 -16462.4 -0.205 
2000.75 8351977.2 8335680.2 -16297.1 -0.195 
2001.00 11233413.0 11234249.3 836.3 0.007 
2001.25 12030931.7 12029508.8 -1422.9 -0.012 
2001.50 12739123.9 12743343.1 4219.2 0.033 
2001.75 12944686.4 12954209.3 9522.9 0.074 
2002.00 12681005.2 12690917.7 9912.6 0.078 
2002.25 13167207.6 13177024.0 9816.4 0.075 
2002.50 13671533.5 13699751.7 28218.2 0.206 
2002.75 13172967.7 13197754.3 24786.7 0.188 
2003.00 12400530.9 12419457.9 18927.0 0.153 
2003.25 13505642.8 13534522.5 28879.7 0.214 
2003.50 13830233.4 13860031.7 29798.3 0.215 
2003.75 13811804.1 13830231.7 18427.7 0.133 
2004.00 13969827.6 13988586.4 18758.8 0.134 
2004.25 14795833.7 14812960.9 17127.2 0.116 
Note: A-without Market Power; B-with Market Power 
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Table 4.6. Wholesale price, retail price and price margin before and after shocks 
 (unit: cents/lb)-poultry 
 
 
  
Year  0wp   0rp   1wp   1rp   1 0w wp p− 1 0r rp p−   0 0r wp p− 1 1r wp p−  
( )
( )
1 1
0 0
  r w
r w
p p
p p
−
− −
2000.00 54.58 153.39 11.62 99.05 -42.96 -54.34 98.81 87.42 -11.38 
2000.25 55.70 155.99 22.66 106.35 -33.05 -49.64 100.29 83.69 -16.60
2000.50 56.81 156.96 30.48 112.44 -26.33 -44.52 100.15 81.96 -18.19
2000.75 57.56 154.95 38.41 115.91 -19.14 -39.04 97.39 77.49 -19.90
2001.00 57.76 156.06 69.91 157.26 12.15 1.21 98.29 87.35 -10.94
2001.25 59.25 155.46 65.66 155.46 6.41 0.00 96.21 89.81 -6.41
2001.50 61.09 159.15 67.84 163.12 6.75 3.98 98.06 95.29 -2.78
2001.75 58.35 160.19 65.62 167.32 7.28 7.13 101.84 101.70 -0.14 
2002.00 55.98 160.16 58.64 163.26 2.66 3.10 104.18 104.62 0.44
2002.25 56.11 160.00 55.56 159.66 -0.55 -0.34 103.89 104.10 0.21
2002.50 56.28 162.81 59.65 167.01 3.37 4.20 106.53 107.36 0.83
2002.75 53.71 164.43 54.78 166.41 1.07 1.98 110.72 111.63 0.91
2003.00 60.32 159.06 59.55 158.79 -0.77 -0.27 98.74 99.25 0.51
2003.25 59.59 160.88 61.86 164.03 2.27 3.15 101.29 102.17 0.88
2003.50 63.36 162.17 64.24 163.94 0.88 1.77 98.81 99.70 0.89
2003.75 64.58 167.20 63.98 167.12 -0.60 -0.08 102.62 103.14 0.52
2004.00 73.19 168.95 74.49 170.92 1.31 1.97 95.76 96.43 0.67
2004.25 79.31 173.24 79.72 174.27 0.41 1.02 93.93 94.54 0.61
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Table 4.7. Wholesale price, retail price and price margin before and after shocks 
 (unit: cents/lb)-layer 
 
  
Year  0wp   0rp   1wp   1rp   1 0w wp p−   1 0r rp p− 0 0r wp p− 1 1r wp p−  
( )
( )
1 1
0 0
  r w
r w
p p
p p
−
− −
2000.00 68.07 95.60 54.59 78.20 -13.48 -17.40 27.53 23.61 -3.92 
2000.25 66.05 87.63 60.89 78.42 -5.15 -9.21 21.59 17.53 -4.06 
2000.50 68.80 89.37 66.95 83.34 -1.85 -6.03 20.57 16.39 -4.18 
2000.75 86.05 92.80 84.97 87.86 -1.08 -4.94 6.75 2.89 -3.86 
2001.00 79.14 94.67 90.80 105.35 11.66 10.68 15.53 14.55 -0.98
2001.25 67.73 94.30 73.45 99.47 5.72 5.17 26.57 26.01 -0.55
2001.50 63.70 90.23 66.36 92.59 2.66 2.36 26.54 26.23 -0.30 
2001.75 70.82 92.53 72.32 93.75 1.50 1.21 21.71 21.43 -0.28 
2002.00 71.68 99.07 72.39 99.66 0.71 0.59 27.38 27.27 -0.12 
2002.25 61.65 100.63 62.01 100.91 0.36 0.28 38.98 38.91 -0.08 
2002.50 66.32 103.27 66.50 103.40 0.18 0.13 36.95 36.90 -0.05 
2002.75 77.33 109.83 77.43 109.89 0.10 0.06 32.51 32.46 -0.04 
2003.00 68.19 119.10 68.24 119.12 0.05 0.02 50.91 50.88 -0.03
2003.25 65.66 111.30 65.69 111.30 0.02 0.00 45.64 45.61 -0.02
2003.50 80.14 122.80 80.15 122.79 0.01 -0.01 42.66 42.64 -0.02 
2003.75 102.63 144.57 102.64 144.56 0.00 -0.01 41.93 41.92 -0.01 
2004.00 106.61 159.37 106.61 159.36 0.00 -0.01 52.76 52.75 -0.01 
2004.25 72.30 141.50 72.30 141.49 0.00 -0.01 69.20 69.19 -0.01 
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                  Figure 4.6. Young chicken exports                          Figure 4.7. Young chicken ending stock 
 
       
          Figure 4.8. Per capital chicken consumption                     Figure 4.9. Young chicken production 
  
0.0E+00
2.0E+05
4.0E+05
6.0E+05
8.0E+05
1.0E+06
1.2E+06
1.4E+06
1.6E+06
20
00
.0
20
00
.5
20
01
.0
20
01
.5
20
02
.0
20
02
.5
20
03
.0
20
03
.5
20
04
.0
no shock
with shock
Thousand lbs
t
0.0E+00
1.0E+05
2.0E+05
3.0E+05
4.0E+05
5.0E+05
6.0E+05
7.0E+05
8.0E+05
9.0E+05
20
00
.0
20
00
.5
20
01
.0
20
01
.5
20
02
.0
20
02
.5
20
03
.0
20
03
.5
20
04
.0
no shock
with shock
Thousand lbs
t
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
20
00
.0
20
00
.5
20
01
.0
20
01
.5
20
02
.0
20
02
.5
20
03
.0
20
03
.5
20
04
.0
no shock
with shock
lbs
t
6.0E+06
6.5E+06
7.0E+06
7.5E+06
8.0E+06
8.5E+06
9.0E+06
20
00
.0
20
00
.5
20
01
.0
20
01
.5
20
02
.0
20
02
.5
20
03
.0
20
03
.5
20
04
.0
no shock
with shock
Thousand lbs
t
 
123 
 
      
               Figure 4.10. Wholesale chicken price                       Figure 4.11.  Retail chicken price 
 
 
                     Figure 4.12. Total chicken value                                                                       
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                       Figure 4.13. Egg exports                                           Figure 4.14. Egg ending stock 
 
       
             Figure 4.15 Per capita egg consumption                          Figure 4.16 Egg production 
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                   Figure 4.17. Wholesale egg price                                 Figure 4.18 Retail egg price 
 
 
                          Figure 4.19 Total egg value 
  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
20
00
.0
20
00
.5
20
01
.0
20
01
.5
20
02
.0
20
02
.5
20
03
.0
20
03
.5
20
04
.0
no shock
with shock
cents/dozen 
t
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
20
00
.0
20
00
.5
20
01
.0
20
01
.5
20
02
.0
20
02
.5
20
03
.0
20
03
.5
20
04
.0
no shock
with shock
$/dozen
t
0.0E+00
5.0E+07
1.0E+08
1.5E+08
2.0E+08
2.5E+08
3.0E+08
20
00
.0
20
00
.5
20
01
.0
20
01
.5
20
02
.0
20
02
.5
20
03
.0
20
03
.5
20
04
.0
no shock
with shock
Thousand $
t
 
126 
 
CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation examines the economic impacts of foodborne illnesses with a main 
focus on the supply side. The organization of the dissertation is characterized by three stand-
alone studies, each examining an independent subject on food safety problems. The 
integrating theme lies in their common interest in understanding the influence of food safety 
failure on agricultural market sectors, and efforts and solutions to improve food safety along 
the whole supply chain. 
Chapter 2 presents a theoretic analysis on how and under what conditions, monitoring 
activities might mitigate the fraudulent activities of food growers under a voluntary 
marketing agreement. The crucial distinction between our paper and studies to date is that we 
allow for endogenous detection in an on-farm inspection setting, i.e., the detection rate of 
noncompliance with GAP, which depends on the effort the producer implements and how 
much auditing resource is spent by enforcement activities. We examine the relationship 
between monitoring methods, producers’ returns, and the probability of a food safety failure. 
Results reveal that in responding to monitoring activities by enforcement agency, farmers 
increase their efforts to adopt GAPs up until perfect compliance is achieved. Meanwhile, to 
avoid being identified as the source of food safety incidents, farms adopt GAPs voluntarily to 
reduce their food-borne risk, even in absence of monitoring. Findings from this study also 
suggest that if the monitoring resource is not enough to cover the necessary inspection costs 
of achieving optimal safety level, the agency will discriminate among farms to maximize 
total producers’ surplus. The general rule of allocating inspection resources is to allocate 
them such that the total amount of decreased fraud in terms of safety effort for each farm is 
same. When auditing resources are very low, the size effect is dominant and larger farms will 
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be inspected first; when the resources are large enough, the cost effect is dominant and the 
agency will target small farms first. The optimal auditing probability for small farms always 
has a larger rate of increase than for large farms. 
Chapter 3 develops implications of food safety for contract design in the fruit and 
vegetables industry. This research is novel in considering the interaction between safety 
effort and quality effort on the behavior of the grower, and incorporating the traceability 
system into the analysis of the contract design. The study provides theoretical evidence on 
the proposition that, when high safety effort is fully observable and implemented, the 
processor induces high quality effort with lowest cost when quality effort and safety effort 
are complements and with highest cost when the two efforts are substitutes. The results also 
reveal that, if the processor finds that inducing high quality effort is valuable, he has no 
incentive to implement high safety effort simultaneously when the two efforts are 
independent or substitutes.  
Simulations based on the assumption that the safety effort is unobservable and 
traceability is in place suggest further that the final payment to unsafe product is not higher 
than that to safe product; the expected payment to the grower always decreases with the 
increase in the traceability rate (i.e., rate of tracing product to source of hazard); the expected 
payment is lowest under complementary conditions, and is highest when the two efforts are 
substitutes. The change in traceability rate does not influence the payments to safe products; 
if the product is detected as unsafe, with the increase of traceability rate, the payment 
difference between high quality product and low quality product decreases when the efforts 
are complementary, increases when they are substitutes, and does not change when they are 
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independent. The penalty applied to unsafe product decreases with the increase of the 
traceability rate, and is always highest when the two efforts are substitutes. 
In Chapter 4 an empirical analysis is developed to evaluate the potential risk and 
effects of HPAI disease in the United States. In contrast with similar studies that take an 
assumption that the livestock and meat industries are competitive, this study incorporates 
market structure into the analysis in modeling the price transmission of HPAI shocks. 
Findings imply that the estimated market power index is statistically significant for the beef, 
pork and chicken sectors, and suggests that, to some extent, market power exists in these 
industries. The results also indicate that the overall concentration on the national level for all 
livestock sectors is quite small in terms of magnitude.  
The simulation results indicate that if HPAI is introduced into the United States, 
restrictions imposed on chicken trade will result in excess supply in the domestic market. The 
market price of poultry products with an HPAI outbreak is lower than before because 
producers are not able to adjust production decisions in the very short run. After trade 
restrictions are removed, the simulation reveals chicken prices recover above the level 
without an HPAI shock. Producers respond to the reduction of poultry prices by operating 
with a lower production. But the long run impact of the HPAI shock on production is 
generally quite small. Producers are able to recover after the shock and sometimes achieve 
higher production than before the shock. As the retail price decreases, the ending stocks and 
per capita consumption of chicken increase due to the decrease in the retail price. The HPAI 
shocks also affect the other meat markets to some extent. In the short run, the decreasing 
demand for poultry substitutes would decrease prices in those markets and would have 
feedback effects on the demand of poultry products. The magnitude of the substitution effect 
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depends on substitution elasticities among these meat products and the degree of market 
power. The results also suggest that the retail price margin relative to the wholesale level of 
poultry products becomes smaller immediately after the HPAI shock and then becomes wider 
with the recovery of poultry consumption. However, our results show that the magnitude of 
the effect of market power is relatively low in the poultry market. We find that the change of 
price margin is small in absolute value and remains almost constant in the long run. 
This dissertation models and analyzes the economic impacts of food safety problems. 
In order to capture the essence of these questions and focus on the critical factors we opt for 
sacrificing some other considerations in our theoretical analysis. This approach, on one hand, 
provides a clear picture how efforts can improve food safety along the supply chain. On the 
other hand, it leaves much room for improvement in the future. Extensions to this dissertation 
could span across several directions as follows. 
In Chapter 2, we analyze the optimal monitoring policy taking the assumption that all 
farms are risk neutral and have the same risk preference. A more complicated analysis could 
be developed when the risk preferences differ. Second, the monitoring resource is assumed to 
be exogenous in our model. A useful extension would be to examine the design of an 
efficient user-fee scheme in a second-best policy setting. Third, the industry response to 
contamination seems to be dynamic, and more discussion of dynamic response may lead to 
interesting implications.  
In Chapter 3, the assumption on the two realizations of quality level could be extended 
to continuous levels. The provision on quantity could be included in the model to reflect as 
well as possible, the reality. In addition, to analyze more closely the nature of the contract in 
the fruit and vegetable industry, the payment to the grower could be expressed in an explicit 
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form, such as a linear function which includes a base payment and quality premium. 
Including these ingredients could enable these models to consider a deeper understanding of 
the performance of food safety on agricultural supply chain. 
In Chapter 4, we analyze the economic impacts of a potential HPAI shock on U.S. 
meat industries on the national level. Further work could be done to determine the sensitivity 
of these results to regional data.        
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